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The Impacts of Unification and Civilianization on the Culture of the
Canadian Forces, 1968-1993

by

Rachael Bryson

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Abstract

In 1993 the Canadian Forces faced a crisis that reached across all levels of the institution when the events of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia became public knowledge. The report forthcoming from the civilian *Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* uncovered a deeply flawed organization, rife with personnel unfit for duty, a dearth of leadership, and lacking organizational direction. One of the major questions that arose within public and academic discourse following the release of the report was how the Canadian Forces had reached this point of crisis.

This thesis argues that two major institutional changes- unification in 1968 and civilianization in 1972- had profoundly negative impacts on the culture of the Canadian Forces, and are key to understanding the military's fall from grace. Using the theory of sociological neo-institutionalism to understand change within military organizations, this thesis will demonstrate a strong correlation between unification, civilianization, and the cultural changes experienced by the Canadian Forces during this period. Leadership will be used as a qualitative indicator for measuring the changes in the military's culture.

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Acronyms

CAR	Canadian Airborne Regiment
CCRF	Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
DM	Deputy Minister
DMD	Deputy Minister of Defence
DND	Department of National Defence
MND	Minister of National Defence
NATO	North American Treaty Organization
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
PS	Public Service
TRIO	Tri-Services Identity Organization
UN	United Nations

Chapter 1

Introduction

The events that transpired in Belet Huen, Somalia, during the 1993 Canadian Forces (CF) peacekeeping deployment are largely recognized today as a turning point for the Canadian military. One specific incident is usually associated with the Somalia deployment: the murder of Shidane Arone by Canadian soldiers. While this may have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, the investigation in the weeks and months following the media leak of the photos and videos from the night of March 16, 1993 paint a much larger picture of issues of discipline, professionalism and internal cover-ups. The report resulting from the *Somalia Commission of Inquiry* revealed a deeply flawed organization, rife with personnel unfit for duty, a dearth of leadership, and lacking organizational direction. This report the government to mandate significant changes within the military, forcing the CF into a period of self-reflection and internal reorganization.

The first paragraph of the Executive Summary of *Dishonoured Legacy: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* details an operation seemingly doomed from the beginning. The inquiry found that the events surrounding the Airborne Regiment in Somalia could not solely be attributed to a “few bad apples”, but had to be considered in the larger context of a deeply broken institution. The report described “ill-prepared and rudderless” soldiers, systemic breakdown, and a lack of discipline- which is attributed to poor leadership and the inaction of senior officers when faced with unflattering information.

Within the report twelve areas of concern were identified. These major themes were: leadership, accountability, chain of command, discipline, mission planning, suitability, training, rules of engagement, operational readiness, cover-up, disclosure of information, military justice.¹ The common threads between the majority these themes, and the most significant of the Report's findings were found in military culture.

Within the literature written about Canadian military culture, as well as the body of literature focusing on the Somalian deployment and the subsequent fallout, there is no consensus on exactly when the CF's culture became to change from the strong culture bred from two World Wars. What is agreed upon is that this cultural change came most notably in the form of a deterioration of professional military standards of training, leadership, and behaviour; consequentially traditional military values began to deteriorate. In search of an explanation for this deterioration some argue that it was the demobilization of the CF at the end of the Second World War that signaled the gradual loss of professionalization within the services. Others point to the flawed recruitment process that was introduced in order to fulfill Canada's commitment to the Korean War, which admitted individuals ill-suited to military life into the institution. Still others indicate that it was the beginning of peacekeeping operations, or possibly the end of the Cold War, that began the CF's loss of operational orientation.

This thesis will argue that two major changes to the organization of the CF are key to understanding the military's fall from grace: the reorganization of the three services of the CF into a single service culminating in 1968 and the integration of the CF and the Department of National Defence (DND) into a single administrative agency in 1972.

¹ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair Executive Summary*. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997).

The process through which the three traditional military services were combined into a single force is referred to as “unification”. The amalgamation of the CF and DND into Ottawa’s National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) is referred to as the “civilianization” of the military. The new organization of the CF combined with the new chain of command that included civilian oversight greatly confused the command structure of the military. Between 1968 and 1993 the CF were subject to these changes, to the gradual unraveling of some of the unification measures, to several shifts in operational priorities, and to an exhausting number of non-combat engagements. It will be further argued that the difficulties the CF had adjusting to these other changes stem from the significant and inappropriate cultural rift that unification and civilianization forced. This thesis will, therefore, focus on the period from 1968 to 1993 and will attempt to address the larger question of how the CF reached the state they found themselves in at the time of deploying to Somalia.

Military culture is defined by Collins as being “the prevailing values, norms, philosophies, customs, and traditions of the armed forces.”² It is also defined by Murray, who writes that it is the “ethos and professional attributes” of a military, representing “the intellectual and spiritual capacity” of armed forces.³ Military culture shares the core roles of culture writ large. It is passed from generation to generation, it is broadly shared by the members belonging to that culture, it is adaptive, and it is purely symbolic in nature.⁴ For militaries, culture emphasizes belonging through socialization processes as early as the first day of basic training.⁵

² Joseph Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View," *The Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (1998). p. 213.

³ Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter," *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (1999). p. 135.

⁴ Karen Dunivin, "Military Culture: Change and Continuity," *Armed Forces & Society* 20(1994). p. 533.

⁵ Donna Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations," *Canadian Review of Sociology* 35, no. 3 (1998).

Unification and civilianization introduced major changes to the institution of the military, and therefore to its culture. Because all of the major categories identified in the *Dishonoured Legacy* report can be linked to military culture, this thesis will ask *did the unification and civilization of the military affect the culture of the Canadian Forces?*

The argument of this paper is that the unification and civilianization of the CF were two top-down, externally imposed changes, which were at odds with the military's culture, and therefore not supported by the institution. This caused a collapse of the CF's self-identity and led to a period of institutional instability. This is not to imply that these two institutional changes are solely responsible for the cultural crisis experienced by the CF, or that they can be examined in isolation, but that they created an environment in which a crisis of culture was able to take root. This argument will be developed and proved from an institutional theory standpoint, using sociological neo-institutionalism, with the aim of demonstrating that a strong correlation exists between unification and civilianization and the negative changes in the CF's culture by 1993.

Context

Prior to 1968 the CF was a highly institutionalized organization, characterized by a professionalization that had begun as a militia defending a young colony, and a strong sense of tradition.⁶ Following the two World Wars and Canada's contribution to the Korean War there was a significant shift in the direction of the CF. By the 1960s communication between the government and the CF had deteriorated and civilian control of the military had begun to lessen. The independent actions by members of the CF during the Cuban Missile Crisis was glaring

⁶ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011).

evidence of a breakdown of civil-military relations and of a loss of governmental control over the CF.

The impetus for unification and civilianization can be traced back to several factors. First is the recruitment crisis created by Canada's participation in the Korean War. In order to avoid conscription in 1950 Minister of National Defence (MND) Claxton made the criteria for physical and psychological examinations of new recruits less demanding for the enlisting process. As a result men who were not physically or emotionally suited to military life were given entrance into the organization, and their presence would endure much longer than the war they had come to fight.⁷ A second factor was the accelerated pace of deployments experienced by the CF to meet peacekeeping commitments and to maintain Cold War training. These deployments interfered with regular training and promotion schedules and were approached with resignation by soldiers asked to leave their homes and families repeatedly for missions that were not truly soldiering.⁸ Finally, incidents that occurred during the Cold War contributed to the chain reaction that led to the unification and the civilianization of the CF. Such instances included the deterioration of civil-military relations stemming from anti-Vietnam protests that trickled over into Canada, and the incident in which the Canadian military acted independently of the government during the Cuban Missile Crisis in accordance with its North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) mandate.⁹

The negative attention that the Canadian response to the Cuban Missile Crisis garnered intensified the scrutiny of the CF from all quarters. The public was quickly losing favour with a

⁷ David J. Bercuson, *The Fighting Canadians* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 2008).

⁸ J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 2004).

⁹ Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*.

military who's values did not represent those of the larger society, and that was becoming increasingly expensive to maintain. While peacekeeping and the Cold War greatly changed the tactical orientation of the military, institutional changes were also on the way.

A succession of MNDs sought to realign and reintegrate the CF with the rest of Canadian society with little success. As the new MND in 1963 Paul Hellyer's first acts was to call for an evaluation of the military administration. He used the 1962 and 1963 findings from the Glassco Commission on government organization to justify the need to reevaluate how the military was managed. The Glassco Royal Commission had contained a scathing account of inefficiency, overlap, and duplicate spending on the part of DND. Much of this was blamed on the lack of communication, coordination, and consistency between the three services. Having suffered personal set backs in his military career due to administrative duplications, Hellyer sought a complete overhaul of what was perceived as a bloated and inefficient organization. The Commission recommended the integration of administrative, technical, and other services, such as medical.¹⁰

These recommendations were carried even further. As Hellyer introduced a series of changes to the organizational structure of the military that eventually took place in three stages. Bill C-90 was passed in 1964, and reorganized the senior management of the military by forming a single position for Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with a combined staff. This was followed in the summer of 1965 by the reorganization of the military into six functional commands: a Mobile Command with army and tactical air units, a Maritime Command, with navy units and anti-submarine capabilities, the Air Defence Command, the Air Transport Command, Training

¹⁰ Ibid.

Command, and Material Command.¹¹ While this led to problems with uniforms, ranks, and unit badges, these changes were generally well received and implemented with little difficulty.¹² The voices of dissension became increasingly loud, however, when the third stage of these changes, generally considered the culmination of unification, was introduced. The identity challenges were compounded in 1968, when Bill C-243, *The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*, came into effect and abolished the individual services of the military, forming one single Canadian Armed Forces.¹³ Hellyer had discounted the importance that soldiers put on traditions of their services, calling these issues of “buttons and bow” extremely unimportant. The Reorganization Act was a shock that echoed through the entire military,¹⁴ which would once again be shocked when almost all of the major Glassco Commission changes would be undone in the 1980s.

A second institutional shock came in 1972 when the military was “civilianized” through the creation of NDHQ. A 1971 Management Review initiated by Defence Minister MacDonald found that the then divided functions of Canadian national defence were often at odds with each other. The Deputy Minister of National Defence (DMD) and the civilian managed support branch for the military had control over the defence budget, and the military and CDS had control over military operations. The Review found that on many occasions mission budgets and operational objectives simply did not match up, often resulting in the military ignoring budgetary constraints.¹⁵ The final recommendation of the Review was a combined military-civilian staff.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² "Unification: Hellyer's Dream Law Today," *The Ottawa Citizen* 1968.

¹³ R.B. Byers, "Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces: Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions" (Carleton University, 1971).

¹⁴ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc, 1996).

¹⁵ Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*.

Under the Trudeau administration this came to be a reality. A civilian administrative structure was added to the military administration of the CF, further integrating DND and the CF at a new joint headquarters in Ottawa. The primary purpose of the civilian administration of the military was to ensure fiscal responsibility and transparency after accusations of misuse of public funds became known. One major problem was immediately evident: NDHQ civilian employees sometimes held positions that had previously been held by highly ranked officers. While members of the military did not immediately answer to civilian staff, the dual oversight of all military programs created a crisis in the command structure as officers were forced to follow standards of the Public Service, intent on running the military like a business. Public servants, who were accountable to government policies, implemented changes regardless of the benefit or lack thereof for the military. This crisis of command, combined with the new command structure from the Reorganization Act, created organization chaos.¹⁶

In 1979 the Fyffe Committee was created to review the progress and effects of unification. The committee found that unification wasn't unanimously hated among all ranks of the military, that there were elements of the military administration that were greatly improved by eliminating triplication and creating more efficient pay systems, medical corps, etc. The committee did, however, recommend the reversal of several significant changes that were introduced during the initial phase of unification. This list included returning to three uniforms, giving a greater voice to individual leaders of the three services, and reducing the breadth and

¹⁶ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2004).

depth of civilianization. All of these changes were refused by the Trudeau government and would not be reexamined until Mulroney became Prime Minister.¹⁷

While not a recommendation by the Somalia Inquiry, the most public consequence resulting from the inquiry was the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) on January 23, 1995. The Commission responsible for the Inquiry put forward an extensive report issuing a total of 160 recommendations. 112 of these recommendations related directly to management within the CF and leadership within the services. An astonishing 132 of the recommendations were accepted by the Minister of National Defence, who compiled them with recommendations from other reports on recent Canadian engagements and education and culture within the services. From compiling the recommendations, the Minister then put forward 250 recommendations to the Prime Minister. Every single recommendation was accepted for implementation.¹⁸

The shocking developments revealed during the Inquiry, as well as the scope of the changes implemented based on the recommendations of the Commission, lead one to ask how the military was allowed to reach such a state. Clearly such far-reaching issues of discipline, leadership, and corruption cannot be placed on the head of one man or one event. This clear evidence of a culture in turmoil leads to the research question of this thesis, and the argument that the consequences for the culture of the CF from unification and civilianization led to further difficulties for the military in facing all the challenges it was faced with until 1993.

¹⁷ Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*

¹⁸ Cl Bernd Horn & Dr Bill Bentley, "The Road to Transformation: Ascending from the Decade of Darkness," in *Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues*, ed. Robert W Walker (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007).

Review of Literature

The research question “*did the unification and civilization of the military affect the culture of the Canadian Forces?*” emerged from a gap that is apparent in the literature written about the CF during this period in time and about the fallout from the inquiry into the events in Somalia in 1993. It is first important to highlight that this topic is just one of many that has not been explored within academia. In fact, the literature available on the Canadian military during this particular period of its history is noticeably scarce. Most of the readily available sources are historical in nature and do not delve far enough into analyses of the root causes for the changes that affected the CF prior to its deployment to Somalia. Others focus on the specific timeline and events in Somalia, and on the Canadian Airborne Regiment as though it acted completely independently of the larger organization of which it was a member.

One thing military historians and defence policy analysts alike can agree on is that the period from 1968 to 1993 was tumultuous and rife with internal conflict and public scandals. Little focus, however, has been paid to the direct effects of the institutional changes introduced by unification and civilianization. Even fewer of these sources consider the effect that the changes undergone during this period in the CF’s history would have had on its culture, and therefore its behaviour.

Prominent Canadian historian Jack Granatstein views Somalia as the catalyst for the recognition of pre-existing, long-term issues. In his work *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* Granatstein identifies politicians who led the military astray. From Pearson to Diefenbaker, Hellyer to Trudeau and Mulroney, he spins a tale of neglectful, self-serving and even hostile

individuals who change the military for the worse.¹⁹ While Granatstein's list of politicians who played large roles in guiding the CF following the Second World War is comprehensive, his analysis places undue responsibility with those individuals, discounting the role of the domestic and global political environment writ large, the state of the economy, and especially the internal workings of the military that collapsed so easily under the strain of change.

Warning signs of problems within the CF are also raised by Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan who write of a gradual erosion of military leadership. Taylor and Nolan cite a 1995 Forces-wide employee satisfaction survey that found that eighty-three percent of military personnel had lost confidence in senior leadership. This astonishing statistic begins their research into a generation of senior officers who were more interested in climbing the career ladder and political leadership than in traditional military service. Taylor and Nolan unearth reports of resource abuse and jet-setting generals, expensive trips for the political elite of the military, and other financial scandals. Finally, the authors write of incompetent and uneducated bureaucrats running the military as though it was any other branch of the government.²⁰

The cases of the failure of senior leadership unearthed in the book cannot be denied, and indeed provide valuable cases for analyzing in this paper. However, the tone taken by Taylor and Nolan exposes a bias in what essentially becomes an exposé of crime and corruption when their work is taken in its totality. The majority of the evidence provided to support their argument centers around testimony from the Somalia Inquiry, and is often not quoted in its entirety. The majority of the cases of corruption presented involved the abuse of authority by senior member

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Scott Taylor & Brian Nolan, *Tarnished Brass: Crime and Corruption in the Canadian Military* (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1996).

of the military, while cases widely available regarding senior members of the civilian defence administration are minimized or ignored.

For historian David Bercuson, 1963 is when the “old” Canadian military began to die out. He states that even though the Canadian military have always been creative innovators, always able to “make due”, Somalia represented a rift in the very fabric of their organization: “The Canadian public was shocked by the “Somalia Affair”; and the Canadian Forces was traumatized. Canadian military historians, defence analysts, and much or most of the Canadian Forces’ current leadership now view the Somalia Affair as the epitome of a loss of professionalism that afflicted the Canadian Army in particular, and which had been evident for some years before 1993.”²¹ Bercuson’s *Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* provides a detailed historiography of the Canadian Army leading up the deployment to Somalia, and the events immediately after the Inquiry.²² While the book focuses solely on the Army, it provides valuable insight into the deterioration of military standards that can be applied across the three services in a cultural analysis.

In her 1989 article *Civilianization and the Canadian Military* W. Harriet Critchley takes a definitive stance on civilianization, arguing that the decision making process within DND was largely unchanged by the unification and civilianization of the forces. Critchley argues that most analyses in this area (of which none are cited) are formed using employment statistics that cannot be compared because of the major changes the CF was undergoing. She argues that employment figures from the years prior to, during, and immediately following unification and civilianization

²¹ David Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 3 (2009). p. 32.

²² Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*.

are not comparable because the very structure of the military organization changes from one year's data to the next.²³ What Critchley fails to notice is that this is exactly the logic behind using these figures. As will be seen in the analysis section of this paper, the increasing number of civilians at the senior levels of defence management become even more proportionately significant in the face of a shrinking force size. Without the use of statistical data Critchley's argument hinges largely on a single source, the *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces Report*, a task force of which she was a member.

Despite its narrow scope, this article is one of the few written prior to Somalia on this topic. Other sources include theses written closely following the 1968 implementation of the complete unification of the Canadian military services. Both theses that this author was able to acquire were written in the early 1970s and do not provide a complete picture of the effects of unification, and barely touch on the phenomenon of civilianization.²⁴

George Boucher, in 1975, argued that not all aspects of unification had been accomplished, but that in the balance it could be considered to be a success. Boucher was writing with the goal of applying lessons from cross-service deployments by senior military officers to the inter-service rivalries plaguing the pentagon. He pointed to the fact that by 1975 there was a measurable reduction in administrative costs across the military, and that efficiency in the same area had risen. Boucher also fairly points out problems that arose as a direct result of unification, such as a rush of early retirements, personnel disruptions, and a slight decrease in recruitment. He then offers some other areas which he considers to be areas of success that are applicable to

²³ W Harriet Critchley, "Civilianization and the Canadian Military," *Armed Forces & Society* 16, no. 1 (1989).

²⁴ R.B. Byers, "Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces: Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions" (Carleton University, 1971)., George Boucher, "They'd Jolly Well Better Do It: Has Canadian Armed Forces Unification Worked" (Army War College, 1975).

the United States (US) military, but with little evidence. He argues that unification has led to an increase in combat and decision-making control by military leadership and that inter-service rivalry has all but disappeared.²⁵ These last points will be disproved in the analysis section below.

R. B. Byers submitted his thesis on the perceptions of various stake holders in unification in 1971. Using available reports and extensive findings from interviews, Byers quantified the attitudes of Parliament, the military, and various interest groups toward unification at its various stages. These statistics and his analysis of the findings will provide valuable insights into the changing culture of the CF during the 1960s for this paper.²⁶

Byers later went on to edit a book with Colin Gray which struggled to define the new role of the unified Canadian Armed Forces. In his specific chapter Byers argues that unification could have provided the Canadian military with a unique ethos, but that it's "excesses" must first be corrected. The chapter reflects a belief that unification would not result in being a negative change for the CF overall, and that a successful implementation of all the changes was a certainty.²⁷

The above review of literature has attempted to capture those sources which go beyond analyses of the events in Somalia. Operational reviews such as "*Here is Hell*": *Canada's Engagement in Somalia*²⁸ and peacekeeping commentary *Dark Threats and White Knights: The*

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Byers, "Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces: Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions".

²⁷ R.B. Byers & Colin S. Gray, ed. *Canadian Military Professionalism: The Search for Identity* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973).

²⁸ Grant Dawson, *Here Is Hell: Canada's Engagement in Somalia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).

*Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*²⁹, are less useful for the purpose of this paper as they are too narrow in their scope and center their arguments on the events in Somalia and the actors directly involved.

Structure

This thesis will progress in four parts. This first chapter has been dedicated to identifying a gap that exists within the literature available regarding the CF prior to their deployment to Somalia and has outlined the research intention for this thesis. The second chapter will be devoted to defining and explaining military culture. The next chapter will introduce sociological neo-institutionalism, the theoretical framework for this paper. Finally, the analysis section of this paper will demonstrate that the unification and civilianization of the CF negatively affected its institutional culture in order to answer the research question *did the unification and civilization of the military affect the culture of the Canadian Forces?*

Culture

This thesis will demonstrate a correlation between the dual institutional changes of unification and civilianization and the negative changes in the culture of the CF between 1968 and 1993. Chapter 4 will provide a detailed analysis using leadership as an indicative factor for measuring changes in a military's institutional culture.

²⁹ Sherene H. Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2004).

Culture has been called the “bedrock” of military effectiveness. It is the sum of the “motivations, aspirations, norms, and rules of conduct” of a military.³⁰ It is the ethos and ethics of a military. Culture dictates the values and beliefs of members of the institution, which shapes their attitudes and behaviour not only when acting as part of the institution, but at all times.

Allan English writes that there is no consensus on a definition for institutional culture, but that the literature on the subject points to four basic functions: The first is providing a sense of identity for members of the institution, increasing or retaining their commitment to it. The second is that institutional culture acts as a tool for interpreting organizational events. Third, it “reinforces values held in the organization”. And lastly, institutional culture is a control mechanism that guides the behaviour of members.³¹ These four functions outline the importance of institutional culture. This one element of an institution provides a sense of purpose for its members, a framework within which to solve problems and the expectations of behaviour of its members.

Theory

Sociological neo-institutionalism provides a theoretical framework for understanding how institutions change from a cultural standpoint. There are two areas within this theory that are of particular importance for this thesis: how cultural factors effect change within institutions, and the specific theoretical literature written regarding military change. The theory provides a framework for explaining and understanding the effects of major change within institutions, and thus has been selected over other, more traditional, political theories for this thesis.

³⁰ English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*. p. 5.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 16.

Sociological neo-institutionalism “maintains that institutions are socially constructed programs or rule systems that operate as established, constraining environments”³². Institutions impart cultural artifacts such as values and behaviour expectations to their members. These values are reinforced over time, and a culture becomes imbedded within an institution. The longer-standing the traditions of the institution, and the more conservative the institution, the more resistant it becomes to change.

Militaries are by their very nature conservative³³ and they change for different reasons and through different means than civilian institutions. Sociological neo-institutionalism is a body of literature that attempts to explain the changes that military organizations do undertake. This theory has emerged separately from the larger body of theoretical academia, and has become useful in the field of political science for its utility in explaining change at the micro level.

Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff suggest a definition which understands military change to be a “change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization”³⁴. This implies larger, systemic change that is not easily explained by the actions of individuals, or groups of individuals. Academics contributing to this field suggest that militaries are most likely to change under one (or a combination) of three circumstances: the effects of technology, strong political influences, and cultural influences. For the purposes of this thesis the main focus will be on cultural influences, but it will be shown that the three are not mutually exclusive and one cannot separate culture completely from the other influencing factors.

³² Paul Colomy, "Neofunctionalism and Neoinstitutionalism: Human Agency and Interest in Institutional Change," *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 2 (1998). p. 266.

³³ Theo Farrell & Terry Terriff, ed. *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2002).

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 5.

Analysis

The analysis section of this paper will support the argument that the unification and civilianization of the CF led to a negative changes within the culture of the CF, evident in the changes observed among military leadership between 1968 and 1993. First, the military's history and culture prior to unification will be briefly outlined to establish a "before"- a snap shot of Canadian military culture at its strongest. Second, the military's culture prior to 1968 will be briefly explored to be able to provide a juxtaposition with the culture from 1968 to 1993. Finally, an in-depth analysis of military leadership, the changes it underwent, and its affect on the CF's culture will be provided.

Limitations

This research and analysis is subject to several important limitations. First, the author chose not to pursue approvals necessary from the Canadian Forces to be able to conduct interviews with military personnel. Obtaining approvals is an arduous exercise and the CF usually refuses to give permission or gives permission for only a very restrictive set of questions. An attempt to obtain CF approval to conduct interviews likely would have taken a considerable amount of time that was not available due two year nature of Master level studies. Additionally, this time limit was reflected in the available academic resources. While the author pursued all available published material and was active in conducting research at the National Archives of Canada, some sources of unpublished information, such as theses available at the Archives, were made unavailable due to a temporary exhibit and floor closure of an undetermined amount of

time. This limitation is significant as those theses, for which requests were made to view, would have added to the academic data written between the period of 1968-1993 on this topic, which was scarce.

The second category of limitations are those which were conscientiously made at the onset and throughout the research. The time period of 1968 to 1993 was chosen because the official unification of the Canadian military, signified by the enactment of the Reorganization Act, took effect in 1968, and 1993 has clearly been identified as a tipping point for the CF by the above literature. The events and repercussions of Somalia are inarguably the biggest shock experienced by the CF and are still impacting the forces today. This thesis will focus on changes that affected the CF as a whole rather than focusing on changes that were experienced by the individual services. Each service has its own distinct service culture that was affected differently by the institutional changes made, but the military institution refers to the combination of all services and military functions, as in keeping with the theoretical framework. This analysis will also address the cultural changes experienced by the enlisted officer corps specifically, and will not address the changes experienced by the Reserves during the same period. Additionally, during the time period of 1968 to 1993 the CF experienced many other changes that profoundly impacted the institution, such as the rise of peacekeeping, the end of the Cold War, and the introduction of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (CCRF). These changes very likely had some impact on the CF. Nonetheless, the scope of this thesis will not take these changes into consideration, as they are considered to be changes that were introduced into an already struggling organization, rather than causing cultural crises of their own right.

Finally, the analysis of this research question is made more challenging by the scarcity of literature available related to this topic. There is a noticeable lack of published or publicly available internal DND documentation from during this time period, specifically regarding unification or civilianization. While dissension within the ranks and internal struggles in response to these two institutional changes are documented by outside observers, official military or government reports on this topic do not exist. This lack of information potentially provides an insight into the military organization of the selected time period in its own right, a topic which will be explored in the conclusion. This issue, however, does limit the depth of the research conducted here. Because of this, proving conclusively that there is an unequivocal direct cause and effect relationship between unification and civilianization and the events in Somalia is not possible. Nonetheless, there is sufficient material to demonstrate a strong correlation between these institutional changes and the change in the culture of the CF that allowed for such events to occur.

Contributions to the academic field

This thesis will contribute to the field of study of change in the Canadian military in three ways. First, it will contribute to the theoretical body of literature of neo-institutionalism as it applies to military change writ large. Second, this research will fill a gap in the literature with regards to both the Canadian military and military change. Other studies into military change have largely focused on the British and American militaries, which are not useful comparison cases to that of Canada. No other state has ever civilianized its military, combining military and civilian staffs at all levels of support and administration, to the degree that Canada has, therefore

making this study unique among the discourse. This research will contribute to the understanding of the internal changes that occurred within the Canadian military as a result of increased civilian oversight. It will also build on the understanding of the state of the Canadian military in 1993 and during the investigations following the “significant incident” in Somalia, which will contribute to on-going and future policy development for the Canadian military.

Chapter 2

What is Military Culture?

Every comprehensive academic study of militaries considers their histories and traditions. These considerations are fundamental to understanding the direction and purpose of any given military. These considerations are also two of the most important factors in forming a military's culture. But why study military culture? How can such an abstract concept hold such a strong impact over the behaviour of an institution? Williamson Murray addresses this question directly in his article "Does Military Culture Matter?" The reason for studying culture in militaries is because it is never absent in a military. It is intrinsic in all aspects of the institution, from ranks to uniforms to symbols such as unit badges.³⁵ The effects of cultural change cannot be separated from organizational behaviour, nor can changes in the behaviour of members of an organization be fully understood without first understanding that organization's culture.

This chapter will demonstrate the centrality and importance of military culture through a review of literature from prominent authors in the field. It will define military culture, identify key factors contributing to the development and evolution of military culture, and will explore what can instigate a sudden cultural shift in militaries and what consequences may follow sudden cultural shifts. Defining and understanding military culture is essential to developing the argument that the unification and civilianization of the CF led to an abrupt shift in the military's culture, with negative consequences.

³⁵ Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter."

Defining Military Culture

As briefly outlined in the introduction, military culture shares core characteristics with culture as defined by sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. Edgar Schein tackles the concept of organizational culture in an article that attempts to define the term and to provide a framework for conducting analyses of organizational culture. In the article simply titled “Organizational Culture,” defining the term is identified as the primary challenge because the concept is fluid and ambiguous. Schein states that at its very foundation, culture is group norms, and from there he extrapolates to state that a culture can only exist among a group of people that “has had enough stability and common history to have allowed” these norms to form.³⁶ Longevity or shared intense experiences (combat is one example provided in the article) therefore have a direct correlation with the “strength” of a culture.

Schein goes on to propose a very developed definition of culture: “*Culture* can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”³⁷ What is key in the above definition is the transmission of successful cultural artifacts, which dictate the values of a given culture and provide the basic underlying assumptions for new members.

³⁶ Edgar Schein, "Organizational Culture," *American Psychologist* 45, no. 2 (1990). p. 111.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 111.

Karen Dunivin mirrors these basic components of culture. She defines culture broadly as being “a way of life that is learned and shared by human beings and is taught by one generation to the next”.³⁸ For a culture to exist it must meet four main criteria: it must be transmitted from a previous generation, it must be common to all members of the group, it must evolve to reflect the current circumstances of the group, and it must be understood to be purely symbolic.

Military culture, according to Dunivin, meets all these criteria. It is learned, beginning at the earliest stages of membership such as during boot camp; it is common to all members, as with such practices as saluting; military culture evolves to reflect broader social norms, demonstrated by the acceptance of visible minorities, women, and homosexuals into the Canadian military; and all the cultural artifacts that contribute to the creation and maintenance of a military’s culture, for example badges and insignia, are purely symbolic in nature.³⁹

It is English who links culture with identity for members of organizations. As outlined in the introduction, he writes that successful organizational cultures provide a sense of identity for their members. This is done through socialization of new members by members of previous generations. This process passes along norms and values, which in turn dictate the appropriate behaviour for members of that culture.⁴⁰ This point will be of particular importance during the analysis of the breakdown of the culture of the CF.

Winslow defines culture as more of a shaping social phenomena than Schein and Dunivin. She writes that culture is a “social shaping force” that “shapes members cognitions and

³⁸ Dunivin, "Military Culture: Change and Continuity." p. 533.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*.

perceptions of meanings and realities.”⁴¹ She focuses on culture as a mobilizing factor for groups. This concept of culture stems from the notion of *Gemeinschaft*, a social state in which belonging to the group takes precedence over all other aspects of identity. Winslow calls this strong allegiance to the collective a “military frame of mind,” but cautions that group solidarity can be taken too far, becoming “mechanical solidarity,” in which a group will work to an end goal at the exclusion of independent thought or reasoning.⁴² Group membership is strongly emphasized in militaries, particularly in armed forces such as Canada’s, where group successes are rewarded over individual achievements. This conceptualization of culture is taken to understand group cohesion and loyalties, which is essential to understanding military culture.

Taking the above literature on the subject of organizational and military culture into consideration, this thesis defines military culture as a set of assumption, including norms, values and traditions, that are transmitted from one organizational generation to the next and which evolve with the larger society that members of the military belong to. The collective of the cultural artifacts form the group’s identity and dictate what is considered appropriate behaviour for the group and it’s individual members. Noticeably absent from the above definition is the purpose unique to the military: to be sanctioned practitioners of violence. It is undeniable that this facet of the military identity influences the military’s culture, but for the purposes of this definition identity and culture are clearly separated. A culture will a direct effect on the institutional identity of a military, as well as on the identity of the members of the military, and vice versa.

⁴¹ Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations." p. 347.

⁴² Ibid. p. 346.

Development and Evolution of Military Culture

Murray conducted a study of modern US military culture in his attempt to answer the question asked in the title of his article “Does Military Culture Matter?”. In this examination he identified what he considers to be the major influencing factors on a military’s culture. As Canada and the United States share many similarities and common ground within these factors, they are easily transferable to the Canadian military experience. Additionally, the Canadian and American military experience, from historical conflict involvement to modern strategic orientation, are closely linked, allowing for analyses conducted regarding the US military to also shed light on the Canadian military experience.

Murray identifies six core influencing factors directly influencing military cultures: history, professional ethos, geography, operational milieu, recent experience (including the collective experience of senior officers), and the relationship of the larger society to the military. Murray goes on to write that while a military’s culture is always evolving in response to changes in the larger society’s culture, the leadership of the military, and the civilian leadership of the state, more recently technology has been gaining a strong influence over the culture of a military, particularly in the individual services. “Does Military Culture Matter?” links the decisions made by the services of the US military regarding the acquisition and uses of technology to the evolving modern culture and conflict engagement of the services.⁴³

Although Murray does not go in depth in his analysis of these factors, their impacts on military culture can be extrapolated for the purposes of this research: The history of a military,

⁴³ Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter. "

it's recent experiences, and the geography of the state in which the military operates are beyond the control of said military, and can therefore be viewed as permanent influences on a military's culture. The other factors- professional ethos, operational milieu, and societal relationship with the military- can all be influenced by the military, as well as act as influencing factors *on* the military. For example, a military's professional reputation greatly influences it's relationship with the civilian society in which it operated. A military perceived in a highly favourable light by the civilian society may benefit from increased political support in democratic states as politicians try to garner favour with their electorate. At the same time, militaries in democratic societies are greatly affected by the will of the people in such direct ways as which parties are elected. Political parties view of scope and role of militaries differently, which is in turn reflected in federal budgets. Technology as a shaping factor of military culture is particularly interesting because of the variety of influences that act on a military's decision making process (i.e. budget, political will and strategic orientation) and because the impact of technological decisions are immediately apparent on its culture. The technologies acquired determine the combat capabilities of the military services, and therefore the operations or conflicts that the state may decide to engage in. This in turn dictates the training schedule for a service, it's recruitment goals, and it's professional orientation.⁴⁴

Joseph Collins argues that military culture is in a constant state of flux as it responds to external pressures on the institution. Once again through a survey of US military culture, Collins writes that "culture has a context" and is acted upon by external and internal forces. He writes that ongoing changes in the military environment create stresses and strains on it and force the

⁴⁴ Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View."

military's culture to constantly evolve and grow.⁴⁵ These pressures are divided into two categories: the international environment and management decisions, and societal forces.

The international environmental and management decision pressures on the US military identified in this article mirror those which have acted on Canada in the past decades. The increased pace of peacekeeping operations greatly affected the strategic orientation of the US armed forces and changed the military culture from one of soldiers who are purely combat driven to an image of guardians of world peace. While the operational tempo of these missions was increasing, the post-Cold War budget of the US military was decreasing, as with most of its western allies. This led to a serious state of material fatigue in the late 1990s, one which was evident in Canada as much, if not more, than as in the US. Collins credits the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as leading to a material revitalization for the militaries of many of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, but the effect of this is particularly evident in the US.⁴⁶ Canada is a case in point for this argument as its military commitment in Afghanistan led to the acquisition of equipment from boots to helicopters to armoured vehicles. During the same period both the United Nations (UN) and NATO greatly increased the scope of their operations, reflecting the changing international security environment. As an increasing number of issues became "securitized" or came under the umbrella of "human security" the decisions to participate in various conflicts became political decisions as much as strategic decisions in both Canada and the US. However strong the international environment and management decision pressures may be, societal pressures remain an even bigger force on militaries.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Societal pressures may hold a stronger influence over the development and evolution of a military's culture because of the sheer scope of areas and issues in civilian society that spill over and have a direct or indirect effect on the military. Collins' category of societal pressures on military culture include a variety of facets of civil-military relations. Civil-military relations generally refer to the balance-of-power relationship between a government and its military. In his article Collins identifies all modern all-volunteer force as a source of great change in military culture. As the demographic that volunteers for the military professions evolves with societal norms and values, so too will its culture. All-volunteer forces present a particular problem for militaries, creating what is referred to as the civil-military relations gap.⁴⁷ A civil-military gap exists in every state, as civilians struggle to understand and accept the role of war-makers in society. The unlimited liability of soldiers clearly sets them apart from all other roles within a state. All-volunteer forces add an extra layer of separation to the civil-military gap as the soldiers seek out the role of violence, in contrast to those states that operate under mandatory military service or conscription.

Civilian culture has evolved in a number of ways that does not compliment the traditional military orientation. One example of this is that today's work force does not reflect the military forces. Women, visible minorities, and First Nations Peoples are still vastly underrepresented in both the US and Canadian militaries. This has become an increasing issue for the Canadian military since the introduction of the CCRF in 1982, which states that these groups must hold representation in the workforce proportionate to their representation in society.⁴⁸ Despite efforts such as recruitment initiatives targeted at recruiting a representative military, volunteer forces

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc, 1996).

face the challenge that some groups are simply not drawn to the military lifestyle. This leads to another example of the civil-military gap, that of the military lifestyle. Modern day North American society has largely moved away from rigidly traditional hierarchical institutions such as militaries. Most professions have moved away from the ideals of group successes in favour of individual promotion, creating problems of recruitment and retention for militaries. Collins writes: "Part of the civil-military cultural gap stems from the inherent difference between typically individualistic, liberty-based civic values- which are tolerant of materials, excessive individualism, and alternative life styles- and military values... such as self-sacrifice, discipline, obedience to legitimate authority, physical and moral courage, a merit-based reward system, and loyalty to and respect for comrades, unit, and nation."⁴⁹ Collins does not point to a specific period where this value gap began to grow, but does highlight that the increasingly technically driven and specialized nature of the military led to many viewing a military career as more of an "adventure" than a profession. Winslow does, however, point to a specific phenomena as the breaking point for the widening of the civil-military relations gap.

Winslow writes that the civilianization of the CF post- Second World War is noted for the emergence of self-interest and individualism both in the CF and in civilian society. She argues that this attitude shift was made possible by a peacetime environment.⁵⁰ Following the Second World War technical and administrative skills were added to the military as separate roles within the services. During the civilianization of the CF many of these positions were shifted to the civilian organization of DND, without completely eliminating non-combat DND staff. Of

⁴⁹ Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View." p. 217.

⁵⁰ Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations."

particular interest to Winslow is that civilianization caused some of these clerical, technical and administrative services to become “more convergent with civilian society and its values,” while the combat roles became increasingly divergent.⁵¹ This is a clear indication that the culture of the CF was affected by the civilianization of the institution.

As with any institution, a military’s culture will gradually evolve and change. Natural adjustments to changes in social values, technological advancement, and political environments are expected and desired, but as this paper will demonstrate, the cultural evolution of the CF was not a natural one. This section will delve into the theorized and observed consequences of abrupt or forced changes in military organization on their cultures.

Schein refers to such examples of non-linear or unnatural cultural change as “guided evolution” or “managed change”. For organizations, instances of such change are largely introduced by leaders who perceive that certain areas of an organization’s culture are dysfunctional, or may impede its survival. This can develop in the face of significant organization failures, stagnation, or if leadership observes that the organization is not prepared to handle changes in the organizational field. Schein writes that leaders generally follow a specific pattern of behaviour for changing or guiding their organization’s culture: First, the leader will articulate the desirability of change by identifying threats that exist to the organization as it currently stands. Next, a new direction or organizational orientation is identified. Promotions are strategically made and new reward systems and incentives are introduced. Finally, if necessary scandals or past instances of crisis will be used to discredit the current culture as being illegitimate and traditional cultural artifacts will be replaced.⁵²

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 347.

⁵² Schein, "Organizational Culture."

In civilian, or business-model based organizations, guided change can be facilitated if the organization is clearly changing its goals or purpose. This is more difficult for militaries, as their primary purpose is always national defence, and the preparation and carrying out of war. In the case of Canada and the US, the militaries also have very strong cultures rooted back before the formation of the states as they are known today. Within these institutions also exist strong service subcultures, that may also offer resistance to change. This kind of embedded culture is difficult to change legitimately, and guided evolution or managed changes may need to go to extremes in order to succeed. Schein writes that to accomplish the most extreme changes it is likely that core groups must be “destroyed” to eliminate the carriers of culture in order to introduce specifically selected individuals to construct completely new cultures.⁵³

There are significant risks to militaries when management attempts are made on their cultures. First, externally imposed change (i.e. from various levels of government) can result in the increased civilianization of a military, as those imposing the changes on a military’s culture may not fully understand it and may attempt changes more suited to civilian or business organizations. Second, a military may become more isolated from civilian society as a consequence of imposed change. This can occur in two scenarios: a rebellion against externally imposed changes or in response to internally driven changes that widen the civil-military relations gap.⁵⁴ Finally, should the goal of guided cultural evolution be streamlining a military to closely reflect a traditional business-model organization, the military may see a rise in individualism, where self-promotion is favoured over the betterment of the group.⁵⁵

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner’s View."

⁵⁵ Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations."

Academics of military culture have studied the evolution and consequences of cultural change. The authors above have generally studied organization culture or specific case studies in the recent histories of Canada and the US. The theory of sociological neoinstitutionalism further supports these authors, and allows for a framework within which the analysis of this paper is conducted.

Chapter 3

Theory

The works selected in the previous chapter to define culture, military culture, and to explain cultural change were drawn from a variety of fields. Some presented theory in the area of organizational studies, others provided analytical frameworks for understanding the importance of culture, and others still were case studies pertinent to this research. The chapter will explain the theoretical framework of sociological neo-institutionalism, which has influenced many political scientists in the areas of military change. Using this theory as the basis for the analysis in this thesis will allow for a common framework to be applied to all areas of the research. Sociological neoinstitutionalism is particularly useful for this research as it attempts to understand change at the institutional level, and it has been successfully applied to academic studies of militaries and the importance of culture in driving institutional change.

Until the end of the Cold War the traditional political theories of realism, liberalism, and Marxism dominated political theory. The sudden and unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union highlighted the weaknesses of each of these theories in explaining many political phenomena. These theories failed to explain many of the intrastate workings that impacted the state as a whole. One such neglected area is social shaping factors and the influence of institutions on the state. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell have written that this “neglect of social context and the durability of social institutions came at a high cost”⁵⁶ in political analysis. In their 1991 work

⁵⁶ Walter Powell & Paul DiMaggio, ed. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). p. 2.

they cite March and Olsen, stating that “what we observe in the world is inconsistent with the ways in which contemporary theories ask us to talk”.⁵⁷ Institutions play a large role in society as they are born out of the same history and culture as society at large. Institutions both shape and are shaped by society. The introduction of sociology’s neo-institutionalism helped to shed light on this area of the discipline by focusing on the processes by which institutions change.⁵⁸

Sociological neo-institutionalism is an organizational theory that evolved within the discipline of sociology. It was developed as a counter to the dominant rational-actor, individual-centric theories that permeated the majority of the social sciences. Sociological neo-institutionalism looks beyond the single-actor units of analysis to explain the characteristics and motives of individuals.⁵⁹ The theory “maintains that institutions are socially constructed programs or rule systems that operate as established, constraining environments” that influence, if not dictate, the norms, values and beliefs of the individuals within that institution. The persistence of the the transfer of norms, values and beliefs, as well as organizational structures and practices are largely due to the authority that institutions wield. The norms and practices of a large, highly structured (or institutionalized) organization become “taken-for-granted” and gain a “rule-like status”.⁶⁰

Institutions are defined by Ronald Jepperson as “production systems”, “enabling structures”, “social programs”, and “stable designs for chronically repeated activity sequences.” Therefore an institution “represents a social order of pattern that has attained a certain state or

⁵⁷ Powell & DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. p. 3.

⁵⁸ Theo Farrell, "Review: Culture and Military Power," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 3 (1998).

⁵⁹ Gunnar Grendstad & Per Selle, “Cultural Theory and the New Institutionalism,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7, no. 5 (1995).

⁶⁰ Colomy, "Neofunctionalism and Neoinstitutionalism: Human Agency and Interest in Institutional Change." p. 266.

property.”⁶¹ This “state or property” demonstrates that institutions become embedded in society and thus have the time to impart their values on members of the institutions. How do organizations become *institutionalized*? There are four requirements for a group of organizations to be considered part of an institution. There must be interaction between the organizations, such as academic exchanges between universities. There must be a defined interorganizational structure, placing the organizations in a hierarchy or facilitating comparison between the organizations. A commonality of knowledge is required, such as professional designation standards that can be transferred from one organization in the field to another. Finally, there must be an awareness between organizations that they are “involved in a common enterprise.”⁶²

Early institutionalist theory developments evolved from Kenneth Waltz’s systems theory. Waltz sought to explain “why different units behave similarly” and “why different units behave differently despite their similar placement in a system.”⁶³ Rather than studying individual units to understand the system, Waltz observed that the system units operate within can explain their behaviour. He explains that “the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within”⁶⁴ as the organization dictates how units may be able to compete for resources in order to survive. When applied to international politics systems theory it addresses forces at the international level such as the social, political, cultural, and economic characteristics of individual units, as well as the climate of the system itself.

⁶¹ Ronald Jepperson, "Institutional, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, ed. Walter & DiMaggio Powell, Paul (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). p. 145.

⁶² Paul DiMaggio & Walter Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 2 (1983). p. 148.

⁶³ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Toronto: Random House of Canada Limited, 1979). p. 72.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 72.

Sociological institutionalism can be traced back to the works of Selznick in 1949 (often referred to as “old institutionalism”), but the theory shifted around 1977 with the works of John Meyer and Brian Rowan, which introduced “new institutionalism”. In the old institutionalism “issues of influence, coalitions, and competing values were central, along with power and informal structures,” whereas the new institutionalism places “emphasis on legitimacy, the embeddedness of organizational fields, and the centrality of classification, routines, scripts, and schema.”⁶⁵ Neo-institutionalism is the meeting point between both the old and the new where all the above considerations are accounted for. Sociological neo-institutionalism focuses on the relationship between institutions and their environments, and the theoretical field continues to expand with works seeking to understand the effects of power and efficiency within institutions.⁶⁶ This area of the theoretical literature will be invaluable to the analysis of this research as the search for bureaucratic efficiency will be identified as one of the major causes for the change in the institutional behaviour of the CF.

For the purpose of this work, sociological neo-institutionalism is especially useful as it specifically addresses change within institutions. Royston Greenwood and C.R. Hinings demonstrate that this theory provides an excellent framework for understanding change by “analyzing the internal dynamics of organizational change.”⁶⁷ Woods observes that the ability of an institution to innovate is tied to the administration of the day and patterns of recruitment.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Greenwood & Hinings, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism." p. 1023.

⁶⁶ Powell & DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*.

⁶⁷ Greenwood & Hinings, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism." p. 1023.

⁶⁸ Ngaire Woods, *The Globalizers: The Imf, the World Bank and Their Borrowers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

DiMaggio and Powell note patterns of change, stating that change in modern institutions is less driven by competition or the need for efficiency than what older institutions experienced.⁶⁹ What is also important to note in the literature is that the more highly institutionalized an organization, and the more structured the transference of norms is within it, the more resistant to change that institution will be.⁷⁰

Highly institutionalized organizations demand conformity from those within, until the institution itself becomes the dominant influencing force for the actors within it. Militaries, which demand conformity from their members, begin socializing their values and norms to new members beginning in the earliest days of training. It may also be argued that this socialization reinforces values already held by the type of individual who is drawn to military life. As a military's core norms and values become entrenched in the newest generation of soldiers, a self-perpetuating cycle of dissemination is created, whereby this newest generation will pass on the norms and values they learned to the next generation. This is done not only through the initial boot camp of "basic training", but also through the hierarchy that the soldiers are parts of, the stories told, the traditions of individual units, etc. This cycle leads to institutions becoming trapped by these very norms and values, making institution-wide change very difficult.⁷¹

If change is difficult in highly institutionalized organizations such as militaries, how is innovation within armed forces explained? One can argue that larger social trends eventually permeate the socialization of militaries as those training the newest generation of soldiers

⁶⁹ DiMaggio & Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields."

⁷⁰ Lynne Zucker, "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence," *American Sociological Review* 42, no. 5 (1977).

⁷¹ Matthew Kraatz & Edward Zajac, "Exploring the Limits of the New Institutionalism: The Causes and Consequences of Illegitimate Organizational Change," *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 5 (1996).

interpret the norms and stories shared in their own way. This may explain how the norms and values of a military stay current with the larger values of society, but it does not explain changes at strategic or structural levels. Changes in the socialization process may even be called more of a gradual evolution in values. Farrell and Terriff suggest a definition which understands military change to be a “change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization”.⁷² This implies larger, systemic change that is not easily explained by the actions of individuals, or groups of individuals. In their work *The Sources of Military Change* Farrell and Terriff classify military changes as those changed by cultural influences, those changed by political influences, and those changed by the effects of technology. These three categories are not exclusionary of the other factors. While this thesis will focus on the influence of culture on institutional change, the other factors cannot be ignored.

Jepperson writes that routines sustain patterns of behaviour unless interrupted or blocked by collective action or environmental shock. High levels of institutionalization can “make a structure more vulnerable to environmental shocks”⁷³ as these institutions are more likely to break than bend. When an organization is very tightly institutionalized any notable change can seem to be a significant one and will have a direct impact on the culture of the organization. Greenwood and Hinings add that change can and will occur with a new set of political actors in power or a significant shift in the goals of the standing administration.⁷⁴ This is particularly pertinent when discussing democratic regimes as there is regular changeover in administrations which can be linked to significant changes in the direction of state militaries.

⁷² Farrell & Terriff, ed. *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*. p. 5.

⁷³ Jepperson, "Institutiona, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism." p. 145.

⁷⁴ Greenwood & Hinings, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism."

The paradox of military change is that, as militaries innovate to change their capabilities, they become more similar to other militaries that operate within the same level of capabilities. This process of homogenization is termed isomorphism. Isomorphism is “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions.”⁷⁵ Terriff identifies two categories of isomorphic mechanisms. The first is competitive isomorphism, in which a unit is in direct competition with one or more other units will change to reflect the field. This may mean that change is undertaken to raise the level of fitness of the organization to match or surpass that of competition, or that change occurs to find a new niche for that unit. The second category is institutional isomorphism, which explains why units that compete directly for resources, customers and political power change to gain relative legitimacy. Isomorphic change is achieved through mechanisms of coercion, mimicking and norms transference.⁷⁶

DiMaggio and Powell expand on these mechanisms of isomorphic change. Change stemming from coercion may also be brought on by political factors pressuring institutions and the institution’s need for legitimacy. External political pressure may arise from societal pressures on the administration, and internal political pressures may appear in the form of imposed standards or standard operating procedures. Mimetic change occurs in response to uncertainty. Any ambiguity that exists in an institution leads that organization to emulate a successful example of an institution in the same field. Finally, normative isomorphic change materializes via the process of professionalization. The spread of standards for a recognized professional field

⁷⁵ Terry Terriff, "U.S. Ideas and Military Change, 1989-1994," in *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, ed. Theo & Terriff Farrell, Terry (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002). p. 94.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

increases the regulation of the profession and, by association, the legitimacy of that profession. Through standardized education and membership in professional associations norms are transferred to professionals and to the larger institutions to which they belong. These mechanisms of change are not always identifiable as distinct, and more than one can be at the root of any significant change.⁷⁷

The choices made by institutions for change are greatly affected by isomorphism. To ensure survival or to outwardly demonstrate legitimacy, organization will change to best reflect the institutional field, adopting prevalent practices, but these practices may not be the best for the organization and its efficiency.⁷⁸ This is often an unconscious choice of conformity over efficiency, adopting institutional “myths” such as “products, services, techniques, policies, and programs”⁷⁹ for the sake of tradition, consistency, or interoperability. The choice of conformity at the expense of efficiency can also be a conscious one, such as imposed institutional or organization standardization by political centers.⁸⁰ What works for a governmental body responsible for the environment or for education may not be the best fit for the department of defence, but for the sake of standardization efficiency is willingly sacrificed.

Large bureaucracies increase the potential for inefficient change. There is often a “coupling” mismatch, where organizational templates do not match with the culture of the organization. Because the organizational expectations do not reflect the organizational goals

⁷⁷ DiMaggio & Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields."

⁷⁸ Greenwood & Hinings, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism."

⁷⁹ John Meyer & Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology* 83, no. 2 (1977) p. 340.

⁸⁰ Meyer & Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony."

these templates begin to be circumvented at the personnel level.⁸¹ Meyer and Rowan write that this is seen in bureaucratic institutions when myths are adopted from various different parts of the larger institutional field, sometimes contradicting rules or policies already in place. Examples of circumvention at the personnel level include scenarios in which “rules are often violated, decisions are often unimplemented, or if implemented have uncertain consequences, techniques are of problematic efficiency, and evaluation and inspection systems are subverted or rendered so vague as to provide little coordination.”⁸² The solution offered to this problem is the halt of ceremonial adoption of institutional myths for their own sake, and a greater freedom at the organizational level within bureaucracies so that individual organizations can make more rational decisions about which institutional innovation will best serve their purposes.⁸³ Greenwood and Hinings are less optimistic about the possibility of decoupling organizations from the larger bureaucracies. They warn that independent change will remain difficult for institutions within their larger field because of embedded norms. By adding constraints from outside the institutional field, it becomes almost impossible for organizations to adapt to sudden or radical change, increasing the instability of said organizations in the face of institutional shocks.⁸⁴

The extent of the change accepted by the institution, as well as the rate of that change, depends on the pressures facing the institution and its resistance to change. There are mechanisms in place in every institution that promote change, and other that inhibit it. The level

⁸¹ Greenwood & Hinings, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism."

⁸² John & Rowan Meyer, Brian, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology* 83, no. 2 (1977). p. 343.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Greenwood & Hinings, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism."

of the institution's dependency on other organizations within the field is one institutional pressure. The more an institution is dependent on others within the same field- for example if the organization is a weaker member of a coalition or alliance- the more likely it is to accept isomorphic change to become more similar (and therefore outwardly legitimate) to the other organizations in the same field. A new organization entering an institutional field also faces pressure to adapt to the field's norms, thus encouraging rapid change.⁸⁵

The ultimate goal of every organization is survival. Without a purpose or direction an organization becomes obsolete, and may therefore adopt the goal of a similar organization to justify its persistence.⁸⁶ As relevance is the primary concern of every institution, it logically follows that emulation is a powerful means of institutional change. As stated above any ambiguity in the goals or objectives of an institution, and therefore ambiguity in its purpose, leads that institution to borrow from or emulate an institution in the same field which does have clearer objectives. Militaries do not, or should not, suffer from ambiguity in their purpose. They are the coercive instruments of (deadly) force, used to meet political ends. Militaries employ soldiers, who are the only legitimate professionals of war-making. Certain states, especially western democracies, may lose sight of this reality, but the commanders of their militaries should not. Emulation is therefore not a mechanism for changing the purpose of a military, but for changing the means by which they conduct war.

Emily Goldman writes that emulation is a "primary conduit of change in military organizations" through "the diffusion of innovations that have originated in one state to another."

⁸⁵ Neil Fligstein, "The Structural Transformation of American Industry: An Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the Largest First 1919-1979," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*.

⁸⁶ Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989).

This can have a significant impact on a military's culture. Building on DiMaggio and Powell's theory of the extent and rate of change in organizations, Goldman asserts that militaries must act as "rational shoppers" as few can afford the cost-prohibitive process of developing original innovations. They choose the most appropriate practices or technologies to adopt from proven models.⁸⁷ These models or technologies may not always be culturally appropriate for the institution.

In a table in her contributed chapter to *The Sources of Military Change* Goldman notes the "incentives for emulation", which are efficiency, legitimacy, and identity creation. The "likelihood of emulation" row states that this factor varies with the desire for legitimacy. Finally, under "model selection criteria", organizations are most likely to choose from accessible and familiar models that are associated with prestige.⁸⁸ Farrell, in his contribution to the same work, posits that these criteria for emulation explain the spread of the western military culture and model to other militaries. The rise of the success of western militaries coincided with the rise of their legitimacy. The western military model quickly became the dominant model for success in battle and was adopted to other forces seeking also legitimacy.⁸⁹

This chapter has shown that the significance that is placed on the role that culture plays in institutional change is pervasive among all literature on sociological neo-institutionalism. Farrell explains that culture is not just the context for institutional change, but can also be the cause of it. Evolving cultural norms can change the landscape of an institution. There are two categories of norms which contribute to change. The first category is that of constitutive norms which

⁸⁷ Emily Goldman, "The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan," in *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*. p. 41.

⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 44.

⁸⁹ Theo Farrell, "World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922-1942," in *The Sources of Military Change*.

contribute to the construction of the institutional identity that dictates the actions that will be taken by said institution. The second category is regulatory norms, which shape actions taken within an organization by providing context through which problems and situations are evaluated, and then suggesting the appropriate response.⁹⁰

Every institution's culture differs. Constitutive norms are established at the initial institutionalization of an organization and are very difficult to change. Regulatory norms are transmitted between members of an institution, from one generation to the next, as though they are objective fact. The longer the history of the institution and institutional field, and the more often these norms are transmitted, the stronger the culture becomes. This is called cultural persistence. The degree to which norms are transmitted and maintained is reflected in the degree to which the institution will be resistant to change.⁹¹ This is an important theoretical consideration when applying sociological neo-institutionalism to militaries, as even militaries in countries as young as Canada have long and storied histories, which lead to strong institutional cultures.

Through these norms culture dictates what change is appropriate. Logics of consequence offer benefits to certain courses of action (those deemed culturally acceptable for the institution) and sanctions to other courses (those not culturally tolerated within the institution). Logics of appropriateness are those socialized values held by an institution that dictate what is acceptable and what is not. The stronger the institutionalization of an organization, the greater the culture of the organization and the influence that it holds over the actions of all individuals within it.⁹²

⁹⁰ Farrell, "Review: Culture and Military Power."

⁹¹ Zucker, "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence."

⁹² Terry Terriff, "'Innovate or Die': Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 3 (2006).

Going back to earlier in this chapter, it was explained that norms within highly institutionalized organizations take on a rule-like status and the heavy socialization of those norms create a self-perpetuating cycle of values and beliefs. Again, sociological neo-institutionalism comes full circle back to the fact that culture is what brings about change in military organizations, but it is also what impedes it. Thus, culture can explain why militaries can be slow to change strategies and tactics, despite the incompatibility of older cultural norms with more current circumstances.⁹³

Terriff suggests an equation for successful innovation within militaries. In this equation success results when both the narrative and the behaviour of an institution are changed, combined with obvious evidence of the benefits of these changes. His article “Warriors and Innovators” demonstrates the successful application of this equation to the US Marine Corps. The equation can be applied to changing a military’s culture, as culture shapes innovation choices. The significance of culture in the decision making process of militaries explains scenarios in which strategies or technologies which are incompatible with the threat environment are used because of their intrinsic tie to the military’s culture and self-identity.⁹⁴

Self-identity is an important element of an institution to consider when making significant changes that will affect its culture. Terriff writes: “One observation is that a major change which a military organization seeks to implement that is not consistent with its self-identity, that indeed challenges an important aspect of self-identity, is very likely to run into considerable resistance.”⁹⁵ Using this premise and the theoretical framework of sociological neo-

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Terry Terriff, "Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the Us Marine Corps," *Defence Studies* 6, no. 2 (2006).

⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 238.

institutionalism, this thesis will show that the externally imposed changes on the CF failed to consider the importance of the self-identity of the institution, and indeed of the individual services. The changes were not introduced by changing the narrative and behaviour of the CF, and evidence of the benefits of the changes was not offered, thus leading to these changes largely being considered illegitimate and being strongly resisted.

Sociological neo-institutionalism is not by any means a perfect theory. This chapter has thus far demonstrated the utility of the theory for studying and analyzing institutional change but it is important to acknowledge its challenges and critiques. B Guy Peters offers one critique of the theory, stating that it does not always provide a “clear distinction between institutions as entities and the process of institutionalization by which they are created.”⁹⁶ DiMaggio and Powell did identify four steps necessary for a field to become “institutionalized”, but they do not expand to explain how organizations join or are added to the institutionalized field.⁹⁷ Peters is correct in highlighting this area as one which is weak within the theoretical literature. Paul Colomy’s critique focuses on the theory’s tendency to portray institutions as “disembodied structures acting on their own volition while depicting actors as powerless and inert.”⁹⁸ The problem identified here is the lack of consideration for agency, the consideration of the roles that individuals may play, within the theory. Deborah Avant writes extensively on agency in theories pertinent to military change, but in her work *Political Institutions and Military Change* theory relating to agency is linked to theories of civil-military relations rather than to sociological neo-

⁹⁶ B Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science* (New York: Continuum, 2000). p. 97.

⁹⁷ DiMaggio and Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields."

⁹⁸ Colomy, "Neofunctionalism and Neoinstitutionalism: Human Agency and Interest in Institutional Change." p. 267.

institutionalism.⁹⁹ Roy Suddaby challenges institutionalism's inherent assumptions. He states that theories of institutionalism assume that change is the desired outcome. He also writes that "change" can be used ambiguously and the "adoption of new practices or organizational forms" can be confused for true institutional change.¹⁰⁰ He identifies four areas in which he believed the theory must be greatly developed: categories, language, work, and organizational aesthetics and humanism, all areas currently not addressed by institutional theories.¹⁰¹ Despite these critiques, Avant writes that institutional theories offer a distinct advantage in that they "allows us to look specially at the development of an organization to determine its preferences and thus allow us to notice differences between attitudes of different military organizations to change."¹⁰²

The utility of sociological neo-institutionalism to explain the changes that took place between 1968 and 1993 within the CF comes with understanding the challenges that the very fabric of a military, its culture, has faced in recent decades. The CF provides an ideal case of a traditionally conservative, highly institutionalized organization with a culture of training and integration that facilitates the transfer of norms. This theoretical framework will be used to prove the argument that the unification and civilianization of the CF were two top-down, externally imposed changes, which were at odds with the military's culture and therefore not supported by the institution, leading to a period of institutional instability.

⁹⁹ Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

¹⁰⁰ Roy Suddaby, "Challenges for Institutional Theory," *Journal of Management Inquiry* 19, no. 1 (2010). p. 16.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*. p. 48.

Chapter 4

Analysis

As stated in the previous chapter, the CF provide an excellent case study for the application of sociological neo-institutionalism to military change and for understanding the impacts of sudden change on a military organization's culture. The Canadian military has a long history and strongly developed professional ethos. It is a traditional and conservative, highly institutionalized organization, where the transfer of culture is facilitated from the earliest days of membership.

Canadians have been rising up and bearing arms to defend their land since it was claimed by European colonizers. From the war of 1812 to the fighting with the British against the Boers in 1899, Canadian soldiers have been distinguishing themselves for centuries. Though its professionalization began early on, as a colonial military it had little control over its direction until after the First World War. During the First World War Canadian soldiers distinguished themselves fighting for British forces.

When Britain declared war against Germany in 1914 there was overwhelming support from Canada. If Britain was at war, so too would Canada be. When Canadians were called on to serve they volunteered in droves and patriotism abounded.¹⁰³ Men were recruited and trained, and became a professional army, navy, and air force under the apprenticeship of the British services. The military grew extraordinarily; regiments, brigades, and battalions were quickly

¹⁰³ Bercuson, *The Fighting Canadians*.

formed, many of which were “created only for overseas service”.¹⁰⁴ These men fought through horrendous conditions and proved themselves to be second to no other men serving against the Germans. The Canadians are remembered for their valour at places such as Ypres, Vimy, and Passchendaele, and for names like Arthur Currie.

The Second World War saw the first time Canadians fought in an international conflict under their own flag. The Canadian military had been dangerously underfunded through to the early 1930s, and was quite small compared to the the commitment Canada would ultimately make. Despite this, Canada made a significant contribution to the war effort. Aside from the land forces of millions of brave men and women who would serve on the front lines, Canada contributed by training pilots for the Allies and producing planes.¹⁰⁵ During the Second World War Canadian regiments fought alongside British, French and American allies, and the Canadian Air Force in particular developed a reputation as being well trained, fearless “Aces”. Canadians were for the first time formed into cohesive regiments and battalions, rather than being “scattered among more than sixty British squadrons” as had occurred in the First World War.¹⁰⁶ Stories of the success of the Canadians during the Second World War, and the heros and idols that began to emerge in the mythology of the Great Wars, helped to form the identity of the Canadian military. These years have been described as the glory days for the Canadian military and Canada itself.¹⁰⁷ The military was well respected in Britain and acclaimed for its fighting in Italy and Belgium,

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p.132

¹⁰⁵ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1999).

¹⁰⁶ Arthur Bishop, *The Splendid Hundred: The True Story of Canadians Who Flew in the Greatest Air Battle of World War II* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1994). p. 14.

¹⁰⁷ Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*

and for its role in liberating France and the Netherlands. But as with most western militaries, these glory days were not to last.

The sentiment of ‘never again’ was shared around the world at the end of the Second World War and many western militaries were once again demobilized. This demobilization marks the beginning of decades of fluctuating force sizes and military budgets, limiting the CF’s ability to grow into a truly effective modern military. Despite its lack of military might, the Canadian military developed a strong ethos. The professionalism of Canadian soldiers has been lauded throughout the military’s history, from the First and Second World Wars, to Korea and peacekeeping operations, and now Afghanistan.

There is no doubt that the Canadian military seeks to train highly professional soldiers, but for several decades following the Second World War the outward appearance of professionalism was often strained. Outdated and poor equipment, far inferior to that being used by the British and Americans, often accompanied Canadians on their deployments. The inability of the CF to commit land forces to the First Gulf War, the delays that preceded air support for the same conflict, and outdated and malfunctioning equipment earned Canadian battalions overseas the nickname ‘Can’tbats’.¹⁰⁸ Government decision making limiting Canadian resources and troop commitments also meant that deployments were underfunded or insufficient in terms of manpower to truly contribute to a mission.¹⁰⁹ As survival is a fundamental goal of every institution, the seemingly waning utility of the CF had a profoundly negative impact on its self-perception. These factors contributed to the beginning of a loss of fundamental professional

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*.

values within the CF. This created an environment where the effects of unification and civilianization were reflected in equally fundamental changes in the military's culture.

The Culture of the CF, 1968-1993

The *Dishonoured Legacy* Report is an excellent indicator of the government's view of the culture of the CF prior to the deployment to Somalia. It evaluated the CF's culture, focusing on three areas where military culture is distinct from that of Canadian society: separateness, changes in the nature of military professionalism, and the role of ethics in the CF.

The idea of being distinct from civilian Canadian society is a cornerstone of the CF's culture. This separateness stems from the CF's mandate authorizing the legitimate use of force in defence of the country, and even more so from the concept of unlimited liability- the fact that the potential loss of life in the line of duty is an acceptable risk. The military-civilian gap grows as one ascends the military hierarchy and is placed in a position where one makes life and death decisions on behalf of others, determining what is an acceptable sacrifice to achieve a military goal. The separateness of a military is highlighted by the importance placed on the value of obedience. Obedience and self-sacrifice are cornerstones of the CF's culture as one might be asked to sacrifice his or her life for the greater good. The Report summarizes this separateness concisely: "As a result of its distinctive mandate and the need to instill organizational loyalty and obedience, most military organizations develop a culture unto themselves, distinguished by an emphasis on hierarchy, tradition, rituals and customs and distinctive dress and insignias."¹¹⁰ This distinctiveness is maintained both socially, through the creation of self-sustaining and insular

¹¹⁰ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*. p. 78.

communities, and physically, through the establishment of military bases removed from large population centers. This separateness of military life is deliberate and facilitates the transmission of its culture. In these environments traditions and customs are easily passed to the next generation of soldiers and their families.

For the CF, the process of professionalization begins from the first day of basic training. Often referred to simply as “basic”, this intensive training program is “designed to impart professional standards of knowledge, skills and competence in addition to core military values.”¹¹¹ Unification greatly changed the early professionalization of soldiers when the three separate basic trainings were combined into a single format, losing the additional elements added by the separate services to the first weeks of a new recruit’s career.

The most drastic of changes in the professionalism of the CF are traced back to the beginning of the civilianization of the military and the increased importance placed on technology. The combination of these two influences led to an increased number of military personnel being employed in administrative and technical roles largely found within civilian places of employment. As the CF became more and more technocratic and bureaucratic, there was a “decline in the perceived importance of the combat arms, the introduction into the military of civilian management principles, and bureaucratic rationalization.”¹¹² Consequentially, membership in the CF became less of a calling or vocation, and more of an occupation. While evidence of these changes appear at the end of the Second World War, the *Dishonoured Legacy* Report highlights the increasing appearance of these changes following unification and civilianization.

¹¹¹ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*. p. 80.

¹¹² *Ibid.* p. 82.

Maintaining a standard of military ethics is the third pillar of military culture considered by the report. The ethics that govern the lives of military personnel differ from those of Canadian civilians in that obedience, courage, duty, and responsibility are placed above all else. These ethics are implicit as the CF has no standard code of ethics, but they are able to draw on several other influential documents to form their ethical code. Among these documents are the officer's commission and oath, the enlisted member's contract and oath, the law of armed conflict, the *National Defence Act*, and the Canadian constitution. Surprisingly, education on military ethics was not part of any of the formal mandatory training for members of the CF prior to 1992.¹¹³

The Report included the regimental nature of the Canadian military and its effect on culture under the pillar of separateness. In reviewing the literature on the culture of the CF it can easily be argued that the regimental culture is important and influential enough to stand on its own as the final pillar of Canadian military culture. Bercuson, Granatstein, Desmond Morton, and English all make reference to the powerful influence that Regiments have in shaping the careers and lives of military men.¹¹⁴ Regiments in Canada are largely divided geographically and linguistically, and membership in one's Regiment is for life. The problematic nature that arises when members develop a tendency of first loyalty to the Regiment rather than the military service has been studied by Winslow who highlights instances of insubordination to superiors outside of the Regiment and strong penalties for in-group reporting.¹¹⁵ The Report highlights

¹¹³ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*.

¹¹⁴ Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*., Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*., Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*., English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*.

¹¹⁵ Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations."; Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Cultural Inquiry*, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997).

specific instances of orders being ignored when issued by superior officers outside of the direct chain of command of a regiment, emphasizing the strength of these regimental sub-cultures.¹¹⁶

It is the strongly institutionalized nature of the CF's culture, and that of the regimental sub-cultures that made the top-down, externally imposed, and negatively viewed changes of unification and civilianization so destructive to the military. As a tool of the federal government, major changes to the military will always originate from outside the organization. However, when benefits are not seen by members of the military, the strong regimental system provides officers with the means of circumventing or undermining these changes. Without confidence from the highest ranks of the military to flow downward major change will be met with resistance, giving importance to the role of leadership in cultural changes.

Leadership and Culture

The Report organized its findings in twelve thematic chapters, listed earlier in the introduction. Of these themes leadership is the most indicative of cultural change. Changes in standards of leadership, the actions of leaders at all levels of the military, and the interaction between civilian and military leaders all provide evidence of the cultural changes experienced by the CF. The combination of unification and civilianization changed the entire leadership structure for the military, from top to bottom, and between military and civilian leaders, which also highlights that this measure is one of the most valid for measuring change.

Support for this approach can be drawn from part two of Bercuson's book *Significant Incident*, which begins with a discussion on leadership. Writing about peacetime leadership and

¹¹⁶ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*.

the encroachment of civilian management styles, Bercuson writes that “[t]he best soldiers in the world cannot make an efficient, confident, proficient army without effective leadership.”¹¹⁷

While this specific quote refers to the Canadian Army, the same is true of the other two services as well.

Bercuson refers to the merging of the military and civil servants “disastrous” as their jobs are inherently at odds with one another. Public servants may simply execute policy decisions while members of the military, once tasked, may use whatever means necessary to achieve the government’s aims under the aegis of unlimited liability. He writes: “The NDHQ system has civilianized the high command’s way of making decisions, hindered the military’s ability to give professional advice, and adulterated the evaluations that the military does offer.”¹¹⁸

Other themes from the Report can also be useful for evaluating the cultural change experienced by the CF as they can be subsumed under leadership as supporting arguments. These themes include accountability, chain of command, and discipline. Therefore the focus of this analysis will utilize leadership to demonstrate a link between unification and civilianization and the cultural changes experienced by the CF between 1968 and 1993.

This section will also provide evidence beyond that of the Report, as the Commission’s findings were limited in their scope and did not fully capture the cultural climate of the CF in 1993. The Commission was limited in this regard in a number of ways: It had a specific mandate to inquire into the events in Belet Huen and many of the chapters are specific to the CAR and leadership in place in 1993 or shortly prior. Despite its specific mandate claims of the inquiry growing beyond its original purpose led to the call for an end to the Commission just before the

¹¹⁷ Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*. p. 91.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 74.

1997 federal election by members of Parliament.¹¹⁹ Additionally, because the incident in question was actions by the Army, the Army was the focus of the inquiry. The end goal of the Report was to make recommendations and not to provide case studies. Finally, and most disturbingly, the Commission also faced the challenge of reluctant, confrontational, and false testimonies.¹²⁰

Military leadership is defined in the Report as being more than management or authority. It is a value laden concept that remains flexible but generally includes the ability to lead, inspire, and influence people, and to be accepted as legitimately holding such a role. In the military this legitimacy is often taken for granted as the leadership relationship is generally one of commanding officer to subordinates. A military leader motivates those under their command when delegating tasks and responsibility. The core qualities listed under the purview of leadership include integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness, and self-discipline. Core qualities are difficult assessment tools, as they are difficult to measure and reflect the fluid values of society. More quantifiable are indicative performance factors, including how military leaders discipline subordinates, whether they willingly accept responsibility, their supervisory skills, their accountability, and their care for subordinates.¹²¹

The core leadership qualities listed above reflect the work of Gen (ret) Jacques Dextraze, who wrote what is still considered to be a seminal address on military leadership as CDS in 1973. He considered strong leadership to be one of a military's most important assets. Dextraze defined leadership as the ability to influence others to do what is necessary to achieve the stated end goal. To do this a good leader must be loyal, knowledgeable, have integrity, and be

¹¹⁹ CBC. "Somalia Debacle a High-Level Cover-Up." In *The National*, 2 July 1997.

¹²⁰ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

courageous. He wrote of the importance of effective leadership, but stated that modern management techniques were dehumanizing military leadership. He noted an erosion of military leadership that was particularly evident in peacetime following the two World Wars, when values such as courage became less identifiable. As he was writing this message during peacetime, stressing that leaders must not only be loyal to their superiors but also to their subordinates, that they must actively and continuously seek knowledge and opportunities to further their learning, and that they must have the courage of their convictions and the integrity to “rock the boat” when necessary.¹²² These values were eroded as officers advanced in their careers for reasons other than strong leadership, such as monetary gain or plush postings.

The Commission identified indicative performance factors as one area that needed increased consideration when making promotions, as they were clearly not sufficiently enforced or valued following unification and civilianization. The findings from the inquiry into the events in Somalia noted a disturbing lack of loyalty both to and from military leadership. This is referred to as loyalty up, loyalty to one’s superior officers, and loyalty down, loyalty to those under one’s command.¹²³ In both relational directions patterns of disrespect and self-interest emerge. Commanding officers asked to testify tried to assign blame or remove themselves from positions of accountability, distancing themselves from their subordinates. Lower ranking officers often showed a blatant disregard for the investigative process, refusing to point fingers at fellow Regiment members, but instead passing the blame up the chain of command. Such testimony was so prevalent that one author of *Dishonoured Legacy* noted that during the

¹²² General Jacques Dextraze, "The Art of Leadership," in *The Officer: A Manual of Leadership for Officers in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: DND, 1978).

¹²³ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*. p. ES-4.

investigation “undue loyalty to a regiment [...] or worse, naked self-interest- took precedence over honesty and integrity.”¹²⁴ This was directly attributed to civilianization: “Bureaucratization has been seen by some traditionalists as a threat to the military’s distinctiveness in society because of its replacement of traditional standards of military leadership with managerial principles.”¹²⁵ The perceived interference of civilians within the military hierarchy introduced civilian values of self-promotion, lessening the strength of the traditional military value of striving for the collective good over the advancement of the individual.

The Report found that military leadership directly linked to the deployment of CAR was not effectively administered. Senior officers were all too willing to delegate responsibility down the chain of command, overburdening regiment and unit commanding officers. Lower ranking officers knowingly and willfully withheld vital information from superior officers, and chose loyalty to each other over the good of the military as a whole. This problem was not limited to the Airborne Regiment, but was pervasive among all ranks within the three services. In the years since civilianization the meaning of leadership had drastically changed and those officers considered to be in leadership roles were content to let the bureaucracy keep the military running as long as their vertical momentum wasn’t slowed.

It is logical to draw a correlation between civilianization and the rise of self-interest among the officer core. Sociological neo-institutionalism explained that emulation is one of the most powerful ways to transmit culture. Goldman referred to emulation as the primary conduit for cultural transformation, and identified the incentives for emulation to be efficiency,

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. ES-4.

¹²⁵ Ibid. p. 82.

legitimacy, and identity creation.¹²⁶ The CF in the early 1970s meets had all three of these incentives. It was in the midst of an internal search for efficiency, the officer corps struggled to maintain legitimate control over the armed forces, and it was searching for a new identity in response to the dual shock of unification and civilianization. Administrative processes, such as promotions protocols, facilitated the emulation of senior officers of their civilian counter parts.

The process for promotion differs as officers move up the ranks of the CF. To use army ranks to demonstrate, the promotion of an officer competing for the rank of lieutenant colonel or below is approved by the Regimental commander. Officers who are promoted to the ranks of colonel, or its equivalent, are chosen from a pool of eligible officers recommended to the CDS. Generals are appointed by the MND on the recommendation of the CDS.¹²⁷ These approval processes did not change after unification, but civilianization introduced the use of Performance Review Evaluations (PRE) and a quota system for promotions that greatly changed the make up of the senior military ranks. PREs were impersonal, standard government evaluations which allowed commanding officers to score everyone within their unit against all others at the equivalent rank. Once each officer was scored within the unit, quotas were assigned for the number of names eligible for promotion to be put forward for promotion. For example, unit A might have one thousand members, and two hundred at the rank of major. They would be allowed to put forward the top five percent of majors, according to their scores from their PREs. Unit B, a small support unit of two hundred and fifty members, with just twenty majors, would be allowed the same percentage. This quickly bred hostility among the larger units as many of

¹²⁶ Emily Goldman, "The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan," in *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*.

¹²⁷ "Military Administrative Law Manual," ed. Office of the Judge Advocate General (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008).

the criteria to qualify for promotions according to the new PREs included postings and courses, which were not always readily available or had long wait lists. Between 1968 and 1993 the traditional career path of officers was also greatly interrupted by a continuous cycle of peacekeeping operations, which made it difficult, if not impossible, for officers to complete language training or elective courses for advancement. Despite the accelerated pace of deployments, the motivation to advance only increased with civilianization, as military ranks were tied into the Public Service (PS) pay scale, meaning that officers would benefit financially with every promotion.¹²⁸ Those who learned how to work the promotions system benefitted despite perhaps not being the best leaders or most appropriate for advancement.

Taylor and Nolan, in their scathing exposé of the corruption and scandal within the Department of National Defence *Tarnished Brass*, identified another area of concern regarding the civilianization of the military and its increasingly business management orientation. The military quickly became a massive bureaucracy of unmanageable proportions, with clear divisions between the members of the military willing to follow the new edicts and those resistant to them. The new DND was disproportionately represented by civilians, a staggering 166 civil servants for every senior member of the military at the height of its growth.¹²⁹ Among these civil servants were all the new high level executive positions created within DND, EX3s, which came to be known as “civilian generals” who marginalized actual Canadian generals in decision making processes.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*.

¹²⁹ Taylor & Nolan, *Tarnished Brass: Crime and Corruption in the Canadian Military*.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

The sudden swelling number of civilian employees within DND challenged military leadership and often led to acquiescence by military officers to the business management style model of operating the department. Those senior leaders who did not challenge the new structure, or those willing to emulate the civilian management style, found leniency and “perks”, as though they suddenly belonged to an elite club. Generals with more than thirty enlisted years, those who were biding their time until retirement, began to separate themselves from the rest of the ranks, delegating more and more responsibility. At the same time reports of misuse of military funds, huge salaries, rent-free living for overseas military attachés, and outrageous “entertainment” budgets emerged. Many of these senior officers used the favour they gained with senior bureaucrats and DMs to obtain plush senior level civilian post-retirement posts. This phenomenon became known as “double dipping” as generous pensions were being supplemented by six-figure government salaries. Unfortunately, “double dipping” was not viewed by all as a negative impact of civilianization, and more and more officers who approached general levels began to toe the company line when it was made obvious that the benefits of falling in with the civilian management would far outweigh traditional military leadership.¹³¹

Not everyone was willing to follow the new company line. George Boucher studied the process of Canadian unification in an attempt to discern lessons that could be applied to a troubled Pentagon in the 1970s. While he found that integrating administrative services and technical trades may prove to be beneficial, he concluded that the ultimate abolishment of the three separate services was a great disservice to the CF. His most convincing evidence was that of personnel disruption- retirements and firings- that effectively dissolved a sizable portion of the

¹³¹ Ibid.

senior military leadership. Just among the top ranks, General and the equivalent, two generals, three air marshals, and four admirals are reported to have been fired or suddenly resigned immediately following the 1968 enactment of Bill C-243.¹³² These cases represent only the most abrupt or note worthy departures by senior officers; this same time period also saw an abnormally high number of early retirements. One author highlights a direct correlation between the souring of attitudes towards unification and civilianization and this wave of early and abrupt retirements.¹³³

R. B. Byers observed that resistance to unification and the reactions of leadership varied across the three services. Overall, the Navy was the most resistant to losing its distinctiveness. Issues of serious contention included the conversion to the army ranking system, the introduction of common uniforms, a unified basic training, and the fact that the navy would be expected to accept the most changes of the three services. Within all three services the least resistance came from administration and technical services, and the most from the combat arms.¹³⁴

In his 1971 doctoral thesis Byers addresses the issue of unification specifically. He found that there was support within military leadership for some integration and the elimination of some administrative overlap, but as the changes began to snowball support rapidly diminished and hostilities emerged, challenging the mandate of unification: "Support from some segments of the senior military was essential if the reorganization programme was to be completed. Since no consensus emerged from within the military, and disagreements arose between the Deputy

¹³² Boucher, "They'd Jolly Well Better Do It: Has Canadian Armed Forces Unification Worked".

¹³³ Byers, "Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces: Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions".

¹³⁴ Ibid.

Minister (DM) and his senior advisers, the reorganization issue raised important implications for Canadian civil-military relations.”¹³⁵

One explanation offered for the vehemence of the objections to unification is the means by which it was undertaken. Once the decision to unify the armed forces was made, there is little documentation of consultation by civilian managers with military officers. Only after the timetable for the three waves of unification (1964, 1965, 1968) was announced was the Defence Council called for consultation. These meetings were done in the absence of the CDS, Air Chief Marshall Miller, who missed the only two meetings ever called for this purpose. Gen Moncel in one interview said the Council was “summoned... like a band of schoolboys” and dismissed when it was clear that their voices would be ones of dissension. There was no detailed planning group and seemingly no master plan. The changes were too many, too fast, and officers were expected to simply accept all the changes regardless of if they made sense for the military or if the order in which they were introduced made sense.¹³⁶

The usefulness of the Defence Council was itself questionable. A reformed Council was introduced at the implementation of unification. The Council held members from all three of the now defunct services and was tasked with ensuring that all the new changes were instituted seamlessly. Instead, the Council was rendered useless by constant infighting and personal ambitions. This only increased the frustration of soldiers concerned about the direction their careers had suddenly taken. Among those senior officers who remained with the military disinterest in the actual goals of the CF became pervasive, and soldiers at all ranks began

¹³⁵ Ibid. p. 3.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

pursuing their own promotions and self-interests rather than training to become effective leaders.¹³⁷

Community leadership also offers a perspective on the issue of unification and civilianization. The two changes drew strong responses from a number of interest groups, and a number of groups were formed in response to the changes. The Legion and the Royal Canadian Air Force Association remained relatively neutral through all the changes. Naval interest groups were vocal in their opposition and took steps to lodge formal complaints with Parliament. These groups proved to be largely ineffective as they had been formed prior to 1968 and members within the organization represented a variety of opinions and viewpoints. The Tri-Services Identity Organization (TRIO) was the only single-issue interest group formed for the sole purpose of opposing unification, and later civilianization. TRIO attracted many service members who had recently chosen to leave the military in protest in response to what they perceived as a loss of service identity.¹³⁸ This group proved to be slightly more influential in influencing opinions as the group was made up of respected former military leadership. This also caused problems for those senior leaders who chose to remain with the CF, as those newly promoted to levels where they were directly responsible for the implementation of the changes were challenged openly and directly by respected member of the military family.

Another indicator of the failure of leadership within the CF is the lack of accountability assumed among the senior officer ranks. The significance of the shortcomings in this area are reflected by the Report in the simple fact that the findings were important enough to warrant identifying 'accountability' as a separate theme which the CF has to address. Issues within the

¹³⁷ Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*

¹³⁸ Byers, "Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces: Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions".

chain of command of the CF is also treated as a separate theme in the Commission's findings, but it is difficult to separate issues of accountability from problems with the command structure.

Accountability, as with leadership, is not the same as responsibility. Responsibility for specific tasks can be delegated, but the ultimate accountability for the outcome of those tasks cannot. Therefore, accountability is defined in terms of utility rather than ethical behaviour. It is a mechanism to ensure that those delegating responsibilities and tasks are held to a given standard. Accountability is a defining characteristic for legitimacy in democratic societies as it ensures balanced power and helps to avoid dictatorial rule. It is of particular importance in a military environment as one must take into consideration the cultural characteristic of obedience, and the unlimited liability of the profession.

Within the CF, accountability is specifically associated with responsibility, supervision, delegation, sanction, and knowledge. It is the characteristics of sanction and knowledge that proved to be the biggest concerns for the Commission. Consistent with the problems with military leadership, these concerns ran both up and down the chain of command. The inquiry uncovered countless incidents of ignorance of disciplinary issues, behavioural problems, and in-group fighting on the part of senior officers. In some of these cases the ignorance was willful negligence on the part of the commanding officer, but in other, more disturbing, cases evidence of withheld reports and information emerged.

In Taylor and Nolan the intentional interruption of the communication flow upward is seen specifically in two scenarios. The first is when that information would pass beyond the scope of the Regiment to the larger organization of the military. For example, if disciplinary action would have resulted in a regimental officer's discharge. Secondly, reports that reflected

poorly on the direct leadership of the individuals or unit named in an incident sometimes did not make it up to the proper levels of command. This is again a case of self-interest and careerism on the part of upwardly mobile officers more interested in their next promotion than the cohesion of their unit or Regiment.¹³⁹

A second problem identified in *Tarnished Brass* was the high turn over of Ministers of National Defence. This turnover resulted from changes in government, cabinet shuffles, and scandals leading to resignations. As political appointments, the MND often lacked direct military experience and knowledge, leading to the increased delegation to Deputy Ministers. It is alleged that at times, such as during the tenure of Robert Fowler, it was the DM controlling the Minister and the Department. Fowler's bias toward the civilian employees of DND was well known. During his term as DM following rules and procedures would at times take precedence over the well-being of soldiers. One example of this rigidity manifested itself when he denied a request for an air conditioning unit for soldiers being deployed to Kuwait during the summer of 1991. This request, worth a total of \$42 000, was submitted to make the deployment more bearable for the men and women suffering through 60 degree Celsius heat during the day and 45 degree heat at night. However, on the civilian side 'mental well being' was becoming a priority and costly 'mental health' breaks during a regular eight hour work day were approved for civilian employees at NDHQ. Fowler also used his in-depth knowledge of the rules and regulations of DND to create jobs and award promotions to his closest advisors and friends, and to give himself virtually uncontested control over the department.¹⁴⁰ Fowler's term was rife with some of the worst abuses of power that DND has ever seen. The fact that his actions went unchecked is a

¹³⁹ Taylor and Nolan, *Tarnished Brass: Crime and Corruption in the Canadian Military*.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

testament to the lack of ministerial oversight and during this period in the department's history. It also attests to the culture within DND, one which show great preference to civilian employees.¹⁴¹

The lack of consistency in MND, and their general dependence on DMs, increased the potential for abuses of authority and caused difficulties with accountability with the MND's office. The MND is ultimately responsible for DND to Parliament, but for years the person holding this position wasn't often in it long enough to answer for his or her own actions, but would be called on to explain the actions of his or her predecessor. It is easy to pass the blame to the previous MND and to say that steps are being taken to repair the damage done by the previous administration. This set a disturbing precedence for senior officers within the CF. Senior military leaders, however, didn't have the same excuses. First, senior officers have generally had twenty-plus years of experience working within the military hierarchy and should have gained an understanding of the accountability which was expected of them. Secondly, personal agendas should not have influenced decisions or actions as the military is intended to be an apolitical tool for the use of the federal government.

The Commission heard a disturbing number of testimonies from officers who had been in command positions attempt to remove themselves from accountability for personnel issues, discipline issues, and readiness issues. The attempt to lay blame and accountability at the feet of those above themselves in the command structure in the form of "I was just following orders" was heard as frequently as attempts to stop the upward flow of responsibility in the words "I had no knowledge of that incident." The placement within the military hierarchy of civilians facilitated the passing of blame, as civilians could not be held to account the same way soldiers could be.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

This loss of the cultural value of taking responsibility for one's actions was a shock to the Commission over the course of their investigation. The Report summarizes their findings succinctly: "The hierarchy of authority in National Defence Headquarters, and especially between the Chief of Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, and the Judge Advocate General, has become blurred and distorted. Authority within the Canadian Forces is not well-defined by leaders or clearly obvious in organization or in the actions and decisions of military leaders in the chain of command."¹⁴²

This quote and the Report's findings highlight the confusion that unification and civilianization created in the chain of command. The confusion that led to the distortion of the hierarchy of accountability was mirrored in the confusion of the chain of command from the lowest ranks to the office of the CDS. The "blatant evidence of a serious malfunctioning chain of command within the Canadian military"¹⁴³ found by the Commission pointed specifically to a downward failure. Those reporting up were not blamed for being unaware of the chain of command beyond their direct supervisors, but the commanding officers who allowed for the confusion to continue, and who failed to intervene when evidence of problems reached them, were found to be remiss in their duty of ensuring command and control.

Unsurprisingly, a number of recommendations for the establishment of checks and balances for accountability and to clarify the chain of command were made in the Report. These included the establishment of an Office of Inspector General, the introduction of audit and review processes, and education regarding the accountability and chain of command during basic training and at RMC.

¹⁴² *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* p. ES-18.

A shocking Philips Employee Feedback Survey from 1995 found that 83 percent of military personnel had lost confidence with senior military leadership.¹⁴⁴ This sentiment of failure among senior leadership is echoed in Volume 4 of the Report, which provides an evaluation of senior leaders associated with the Somalia deployment. The problem of senior leadership, however, clearly goes back much farther than those who were directly in command in March of 1993, as their leadership abilities were shaped by commanding officers who came before them, and their career paths were facilitated by an administration focused on rewarding “yes men”. In fact, *Dishonoured Legacy* itself provides ample evidence that unification and civilianization affected the culture of the CF.¹⁴⁵ While the Report deals specifically with the deployment (including pre-deployment and actions following the revelation of the incident), some of which is specific to the CAR, much can be inferred about the state of the CF as a whole from its findings.

Not everyone can inspire or motivate, thus not everyone can be a leader. Additionally, not everyone is self-motivated to remain a strong leader. Although this is generally recognized as a key trait of senior officers, it is difficult to establish mechanisms that ensure that strong leaders are promoted to senior roles. It is evident that DND failed to promote the right people at the right times, and for the right reasons, leading to a lack of strong leaders by the early 1990s. A direct correlation between the failure of military leadership and the negative changes to the culture of

¹⁴⁴ "Military and Civilian Employee Feedback Survey," ed. Department of National Defence (Ottawa: The Phillips Group/ The Wyatt Comany, 1995).

¹⁴⁵ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*.

the CF- namely a lowering of the standards of professionalism, a loss of military values of leadership, and the rise of self-interest and careerism among officers.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This final chapter will begin by applying sociological neo-institutionalism more briefly, and more generally, to the culture of the CF between 1968 and 1993 to demonstrate how an understanding of theory could act as an important preventative measure for future scenarios of change on the scale of unification and/ or civilianization. Three recommendations stemming from observations made within this research will then be stated. Next, stepping slightly outside of the purview of this thesis, several other consequences directly linked to the culture of the CF, and equally linked to unification and civilianization, will be identified as areas warranting further investigation. Finally, some key limitations and the contributions to literature stated in the introduction will be reviewed and developed.

Preventative Measures: Applying the Theory

As the chapter outlining sociological neo-institutionalism and its utility in understanding change and culture showed, the importance of recognizing a military's culture is not a new consideration, but the available body of theoretical literature has greatly evolved since 1968 and 1972. This section will demonstrate that sociological neo-institutionalism doesn't only provide us with a means of explaining why the CF rejected so many of the changes introduced in 1968 and 1972, but how the theory can be used to predict culture clash and resistance to change in the future.

As institutional culture and change are undoubtedly linked, chief among the theoretical analysis is the establishment of an institution's adaptability to change. Change takes various forms. Some institutional change is gradual or even natural, such as growth in various sectors, the expansion of administrative support, and the increase in specialization. Other changes are more abrupt, sometimes even forced, and are difficult for institutions to adapt to. These latter changes can send an institution into shock. These are the changes that were experienced by the CF in 1968 and again in 1972.

An institution's stability, in this instance referring to its ability to withstand some institutional shock, stems from two areas: the level of the institutionalization and the strength of the institutional norms. As noted in the above theory chapter, militaries are highly institutionalized organizations. Three factors contribute to their high level of institutionalization: the longevity of militaries, the demand for conformity from members within militaries, and the strong socialization of soldiers.¹⁴⁶ The combination of the above factors facilitate norms within a military gaining "rule-like-status". In this the Canadian military is no more and no less institutionalized than other western militaries. While it is a relatively young professional military compared to those of Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States, the Canadian military benefitted greatly from the traditions of the British military as a colonial force. The CF was praised for its professionalism and skilled soldiering in every conflict from the Boer War to the Korean War,¹⁴⁷ but never quite lived up to the standard set by the British and American forces. The CF has, however, succeeded in creating a strong system of norms transference through

¹⁴⁶ Zucker, "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence."

¹⁴⁷ Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*.

traditions, socialization, and generational transfers of knowledge, much like their closest neighbours and allies.

Sociological neo-institutionalism maintains that all institutions contain two kinds of norms. The first, constitutive norms, are those that contribute to the construction of said institution's identity.¹⁴⁸ Canadian constitutive norms are largely the same as those of other modern militaries and include the norms of service, leadership, deference to authority, and training. These values were strong and stable before the unification of the three services. During the 1968 to 1993 timeframe the only constitutive norm not interrupted was that of service. The values of leadership changed, as demonstrated by the trend of self-promotion and self-aggrandizement that appeared within the ranks of senior leadership. The norm of deference to authority was interrupted similarly by the introduction of the dual civilian command structure. Finally, the training schedules and the value preparedness became chaotic and unstructured between the speed with which technology evolved during the time period and the continual interruption of peacekeeping operations.

Regulatory norms, the second category identified by sociological neo-institutionalism, are less stable than constitutive norms. They shape and give context to decisions taken by institutions and dictate what is appropriate through lenses of experience.¹⁴⁹ Regulatory norms evolve gradually with the culture of an institutions, and are more vulnerable to environmental shocks. The unification and civilianization of the CF thrust the CF into a situation in which all its recent experience no longer applied. As a single force with civilian oversight the framework of experience suddenly disappeared.

¹⁴⁸ Farrell, "Review: Culture and Military Power."

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

These two categories of norms allow the current institutional culture to dictate logics of consequence and logics of appropriateness. Logics of consequence impose either benefits or sanctions on courses of action available to the institution. Logics of appropriateness are the values held by the institution that convey what is appropriate and what is not.¹⁵⁰ Logics are more flexible than norms, acting as guidelines rather than gaining 'rule-like-status'. Logics can, however, be shaken in the same way norms can be- be sudden or forced institutional change.

As a highly institutionalized organization, the CF were vulnerable to institutional shock from the sudden change of unification. It disrupted both the institution's norms and logics. The natural evolution of the military's culture was interrupted by the externally imposed changes, instituted by the civilian public service with minimal regard for whether or not these changes would be readily accepted by the CF. If the Canadian military's constitutive norms were shaken then it's regulatory norms were all but eliminated, which led to the distortion of both the institution's logics of consequences and logics of appropriateness. The loss of all these guiding frameworks lead to a crisis of culture, whereby the CF has had to relearn it's institutional values and what was considered to be appropriate for the organization.

Sociological neo-institutionalism explains that institutional change is largely guided by isomorphism. Institutions will make choices based on best practices within the organizational field in order to retain their outward legitimacy.¹⁵¹ In the case of the CF the isomorphic changes made were coercive and conscientious choices of conformity over efficiency. The changes did not reflect the organizational field of western militaries, which themselves contain bureaucracies,

¹⁵⁰ Terriff, "'Innovate or Die': Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps."

¹⁵¹ Greenwood & Hinings, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism."

but the organizational field of Canadian federal government departments. This change to a standardized civilian way of conducting government affairs did not match the culture of the CF, introducing mismatching logics of appropriateness and consequence.

Meyer and Rowan warn of potential circumvention of changes that are instituted against the culture of the organization and result in a “coupling mismatch”.¹⁵² The examples listed in their work of circumvention at the personnel level, including violation of new rules, stalled implementation of new practices, and subversion of the new system through inaccurate evaluations and inspections are all found in cases of insubordination documented in *Dishonoured Legacy*.¹⁵³

Explanations for the resistance to the changes introduced through unification and civilianization are also found in sociological neo-institutionalism. Neil Fligstein explained that for every mechanism in place to promote change within large institutions there is one to inhibit it.¹⁵⁴ So how then does the government effectuate change within the military, as it remains a federal department? In a large, highly institutionalized organization such as the CF, changes instituted from the top-down, and originating from outside the military sphere with no evidence of obvious benefits to the institution, would have met resistance at every level, from the office of the CDS to the instructors at basic training. In following with Terriff’s equation for successful change, if sufficient evidence of benefits is demonstrated, resistance to change will decline.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² John Meyer & Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony."

¹⁵³ *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*.

¹⁵⁴ Neil Fligstein, "The Structural Transformation of American Industry: An Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the Largest Firms 1919-1979," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*.

¹⁵⁵ Terriff, "'Innovate or Die': Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps."

Implications for Future Change

The role that leadership plays in the culture of the CF should not be ignored, but rather harnessed to make positive changes for the future direction of the military.

The importance of military leadership can not be overstated. As the above has demonstrated, the ramifications of unification and civilianization were felt within all three services and amongst all ranks. The most notable area of these changes, and the most compelling evidence of cultural change, however, was among the leadership of the military. The loss of a strong military style leadership allowed for a confused chain of command, for issues of discipline to go unaddressed, and ultimately for soldiers unfit for deployment to be sent to Somalia. Changes made within the institution of the CF, whether organization-wide or within a single unit, should originate from the highest ranks of the military and flow downward in a consistent manner, with vigilant oversight. In order to ensure that changes are introduced in this fashion, leadership must be in agreement with the changes, or at least understand the value of them.

Major changes to the CF should be undertaken only after significant internal consultation and should be internally driven and introduced at the ground level.

Detailed above, the externally-driven, top down nature of both unification and civilianization immediately put these two changes at odds with the culture of the CF. Earlier, Terriff's equation for successful innovation was outlined, and this equation would serve the CF well in the future. To increase the chance of successful implementation and for desirable results

change should originate at both the level of the institutional narrative and throughout the institution at the behavioural level. The narrative and behaviour are most likely to accept innovation or change should obvious evidence of benefits be demonstrated to all members of the institution.

The CF should look to successful comparative examples when considering major change or innovation.

As highlighted in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, military change is paradoxical. The more militaries change and innovate to remain relevant and competitive, the closer they begin to resemble other militaries considered to be within their institutional field. Much of this resemblance can be attributed to emulation, as militaries can derive legitimacy from following the example of successful comparisons. Unification was an attempt to transform the CF into a more efficient military, and yet no other western military has ever emulated this example. Clearly the culture of the CF during the 1970s and 1980s was not an example to follow.

Additional Cultural Consequences

In seeking to answer the research question first asked in this thesis, *did the unification and civilianization of the military affect the culture of the Canadian Forces*, this paper has been able to demonstrate a clear correlation between these two phenomena and negative cultural consequences seen throughout the CF. The paucity of publicly available information makes it problematic explicitly to link direct cause and effect in this case. This paper nonetheless has shown that the changes introduced by unification and civilianization were top-down, externally

imposed changes, which were at odds with the military's culture, and therefore not supported by the institution, reflected most tellingly in military leadership. In addition to the evidence provided by issues of military leadership, four areas of grave consequences stemming from unification and civilianization can be identified, and would warrant further research: a collapse of institutional self-identity, the diminution of professionalism, a loss of public trust, and the loss of some mechanisms of organizational self-direction. The total sum of these four areas of ramifications culminated in a period of significant cultural instability for the Canadian military

Collapse of Self-Identity

English's four function of institutional culture, outlined in the introduction, provide good indicators for assessing the state of an institution's self-identity. From the above analysis it is clear that the CF did not fulfill the requirements for a coherent culture among its members. It did not provide a sense of identity for its members, and failed to increase or retain member commitment. This is evidenced by the large waves of decommissions and early retirements, particularly toward the end of the 1980s and immediately following the events in Somalia becoming public.¹⁵⁶ Institutional culture was not available to act as a tool for interpretation, as evidenced by the dissolution of various norms and logics. The self-identity of the CF collapsed because the flow of cultural artifacts from one generation to the next was interrupted. This resulted in organizational values not being reinforced properly or sufficiently during this time period, and culture ceasing to be a mechanism that guided the actions of the members of the CF.

¹⁵⁶ Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*

Loss of Professionalism

One apparent consequence of civilianization more than of unification is the loss of strict and high standards of professional military values within the CF. As the public servants of DND began to exert their authority, emulation toward the dominant management style, and therefore behavioural style, occurred. Unfortunately the values of the public service, and indeed their very purpose, is not that of the military. Officers, and the CF in general, lost some of their strategic focus and sense of purpose as they increasingly became indistinguishable from their civilian counterparts in all but the combat arms.

Loss of Public Trust

Reestablishing a cohesive and honourable culture proved to be a far greater challenge than adapting to the bureaucratic and organizational changes of unification and civilianization. The individual personalities and leadership principles of the three services were eroded. Constructive criticism of senior officers by subordinates was devalued. The introduction of civilian influence into the military hierarchy greatly affected the promotion process for officers—those who were willing to ‘play the political game’ benefitted from support from executive level DND employees. Strong, independent leadership was not valued within the public service, but business style practices of management were rewarded.¹⁵⁷ The CF also suffered a crisis of *raison d’être*, losing its institutional purpose when the Cold War ended, and struggling to meet new, non-combat commitments that had not previously been within the mandate of the military. It can be argued that during the period of 1968 to 1993 the culture of the CF never did recover, and that

¹⁵⁷ Taylor & Nolan, *Tarnished Brass: Crime and Corruption in the Canadian Military*.

it wasn't until the reforms implemented following the Somalia inquiry that norms and logics were able to stabilize once again.

Compounding this crisis of values was the external view that society held of the military. Reports of scandals, fiscal irresponsibilities, and soldier misconduct were prevalent in the media. While public opinion was in favour of Canadian participation in peacekeeping missions, the public was quick to display their disfavour with the military when reports of challenges and mission stagnation emerged from these same missions. For several decades society displayed a very limited understanding of what the role of the Canadian military was.¹⁵⁸ This led to a widening of the gap between society and the military at a time when members of the military were increasingly integrating their personal lives with the civilian world. Examples of this include the increased number of officers living off base, the increased number of military wives (and husbands) maintaining careers off base and lessening their integration into the military lifestyle, and the increased number of officer's children who were sent to school off base.

Loss of Self-Direction

Like other branches of the federal government, much of the value associated with the Canadian military is linked directly with public opinion. This became even more true following the civilianization of the CF. When public opinion is strongly in favour of the military political parties that believe in a large and strong military benefit from a greater percentage of the vote. This can lead to a government which supports the military, further reinforcing public opinion. But the opposite is also true. When public opinion is low a government that is more likely to cut

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

defence spending is likely to benefit, therefore further disparaging the image of the military.

Public opinion, therefore, matters because the military derives its legitimacy from the public, as does the government and its other various departments.

Civilianization led to Public Service oversight of the CF's budget, human resources and administrative and clerical services, to name a few. These changes, while representing a shift in power toward the civilian management of Canadian defence, could all be taken in stride as being mandated by civilianization for the sake of consistency and in an attempt for efficiency. The most notable example of a loss of self-direction is the conducting of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Incidents resulting in arrests of military personnel during a military operation are subject to investigation and legal action by CF. The Commission was formed counter to this legal authority. Public outcry and stalled military investigations led the government to remove the power of investigation into the incident from the CF, putting the review under civilian control.¹⁵⁹

Research Limitations Reprised

As stated in the "Limitations" subsection of the introduction, this research was subject to several limitations, both those established at the onset by the author, and those beyond the author's control. Upon completion of the research for this thesis one specific limitation warrants further comment.

While the access to information was challenging with the unanticipated closures at the National Archives, the biggest challenge was the quantity of literature written regarding the CF

¹⁵⁹ Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*.

after the Second World War. The academic field is not barren, and indeed great authors such as Granatstein, Bercuson, and Morton continue to publish important bodies of literature on the Canadian military, but a great many of the sources utilized herein are borrowed from the history genre despite the political science nature of this thesis. Where information did prove to be scarce, however, was in providing analysis and in-depth, unbiased case studies from the time period directly preceding CAR's deployment to Somalia.

This is understandable to a certain degree, after all many monumental changes to society at large and to the CF specifically occurred between 1968 and 1993, such as the rise of peacekeeping, the unanticipated end of the Cold War, and the introduction of the CCRF, which had implications for the CF in terms of the recruitment and introduction of women, visible minorities, and First National peoples into the officer corps. What cannot be overlooked is the lack of internal documentation regarding the examples of cultural crisis, widely documented elsewhere, by the CF. There is an incredible limited amount of official government information readily available on this topic, other than the often cited "big" reports from the Glassco Commission and the Management Review. In fact, the bibliographies of those few academic source on this time period have strong similarities.

What does this tell us? The lack of internal documentation by DND is significant. Were the internal struggles of the CF to adapt to unification and civilianization that poorly documented? Were reports ignored as unimportant in the face of the large goal of institutional change? Or were disciplinary incidents and other similar occurrences simply not reported at all for fear of a poor reflection on the commanding officer? The lack of academic sources is also worthy of note. Is this a reflection on the closed nature of the CF, notoriously reluctant to open

itself to external examination? And are the CF causing themselves more harm in the long run by leaving the learning of these important lesson too late? These questions would also benefit from further exploration.

Contributions to the academic field

This thesis contributes to the field of study of change in the Canadian military in three ways. First, it contributes to the theoretical body of literature of neo-institutionalism as it applies to military change writ large. It also applied the theory in an atypical way, focusing in on one single determinant for change- culture- in isolation from those of politics and technology. Second, this research filled a gap in the literature with regards to the Canadian military, cultural change, and the impact of leadership. Third, this research contributed to the understanding of the internal changes that occurred within the Canadian military as a result of the dual impacts of unification and civilianization, demonstrating a strong correlation between these events and changes that are recognized as negative to the culture of the CF between 1968 and 1993.

The effects of unification and civilianization were drastic at every rank and in each service and command. The culture of the CF suffered greatly for the mismanaged and externally imposed changes, the consequences of which reverberated through the organization for decades. The redivision of the three services and the return to the Regiments of old did not immediately fix many of the issues that arose between 1968 and the 1980s. For the CF, it was impossible to go back to the culture it once had. Values have changed and aspects of its long tradition appear to have been lost, possibly beyond recovery. Additionally, the restructuring of Regiments had been

utilitarian rather than equitable, with some Regiments benefitting disproportionately in terms of direct access of assets and manpower. While the direct effect that can be attributed mainly to unification were certainly destructive, many of these effects were gradually undone when the CF returned to three services. Those effects which were not undone, or that continued to worsen, were also effected by civilianization.

This thesis asked the question “*did the unification and civilization of the military affect the culture of the Canadian Forces?*” and argued that a strong correlation argued between the phenomena. Since the conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia the CF has made significant efforts toward repairing its damaged institutional culture, but the true test of time will only come when the Canadian military is once again faced with necessary institution-wide change. How they handle the change will reveal whether important lessons have been learned, or whether history is doomed to repeat itself.

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